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Summary 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) being 
negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. On March 15, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
announced that Japan would seek to participate in the TPP negotiations. On April 24, 2013, the 
Obama Administration gave Congress notice of its intent to negotiate with Japan in the TPP, and 
Japan participated for the first time in the round of negotiations in Malaysia during late July 2013. 
U.S. negotiators and others describe and envision the TPP as a “comprehensive and high-
standard” FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all goods and services and include 
commitments beyond those currently established in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
broad outline of an agreement was announced on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) ministerial in November 2011, in Honolulu, HI. If concluded as envisioned, 
the TPP potentially could eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment among 
the parties and could serve as a template for a future trade pact among APEC members and 
potentially other countries. Congress has a direct interest in the negotiations, both through 
influencing U.S. negotiating positions with the executive branch, and by passing legislation to 
implement any resulting agreement.  
The 18th round of negotiations concluded in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia on July 24, 2013, and the 
19th round is scheduled to be held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei on August 23-30. The current 
goal is to reach an agreement by the end of 2013. For this deadline to be achieved, outstanding 
negotiating positions may need to be tabled soon in order for political decisions to be made. The 
negotiating dynamic itself is complex: decisions on key market access issues such as dairy, sugar, 
and textiles and apparel may be dependent on the outcome of controversial rules negotiations 
such as intellectual property rights or state-owned enterprises. 
Twenty-nine chapters in the agreement are under discussion. The United States is negotiating 
market access for goods, services, and agriculture with countries with which it does not currently 
have FTAs: Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Negotiations are also being 
conducted on disciplines to intellectual property rights, trade in services, government 
procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labor, and environmental standards and 
other issues. In many cases, the rules being negotiated are intended to be more rigorous than 
comparable rules found in the WTO. Some topics, such as state-owned enterprises, regulatory 
coherence, and supply chain competitiveness, break new ground in FTA negotiations. As the 
countries that make up the TPP negotiating partners include advanced industrialized, middle 
income, and developing economies, the TPP, if implemented, may involve substantial 
restructuring of the economies of some participants. 
The TPP serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it is the leading trade policy 
initiative of the Obama Administration, and is a manifestation of the Administration’s “pivot” to 
Asia. If concluded, it may serve to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by 
harmonizing existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, attracting new participants, and 
establishing regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing 
impetus to future multilateral liberalization under the WTO. 
As the negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress are emerging. One is 
whether the United States can balance its vision of creating a “comprehensive and high standard” 
agreement with a large and expanding group of countries, while not insisting on terms that other 
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countries will reject. Another issue is how Congress will consider the TPP, if concluded. The 
present negotiations are not being conducted under the auspices of formal trade promotion 
authority (TPA)—the latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007—although the Administration informally 
is following the procedures of the former TPA. If TPP implementing legislation is brought to 
Congress, TPA may need to be considered if the legislation is not to be subject to potentially 
debilitating amendments or rejection. Finally, Congress may seek to weigh in on the addition of 
new members to the negotiations, before or after the negotiations conclude. 
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Figure 1. Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries 
(2012) 
 
Source: Analysis by CRS. Population and GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. Trade data 
from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). Total trade includes both imports and exports, but does 
not include services trade. 
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Introduction  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 12, and 
perhaps more, countries. The United States and 11 other countries of the Asia-Pacific region—
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and 
Vietnam—are negotiating the text of the FTA with Japan expected to negotiate in July 2013. With 
29 chapters under negotiation, the TPP partners envision the agreement to be “comprehensive and 
high-standard,” in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, 
services, and agriculture, and to establish rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct 
investment and other economic activities. They also strive to create a “21st-century agreement” 
that addresses new and cross-cutting issues presented by an increasingly globalized economy. 
The TPP draws congressional interest on a number of fronts. Congress would have to approve 
implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement to enter into force. In 
addition, under long-established executive-legislative practice, the Administration notifies and 
consults with congressional leaders, before, during, and after trade agreements have been 
negotiated. Furthermore, the TPP will likely affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. 
economy of direct interest to Members of Congress and could influence the shape and path of 
U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future.  
This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the 
negotiations (to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under 
negotiation, the policy and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for 
Congress that the TPP presents. The report will be revised and updated as events warrant.  
2011 TPP Leaders Statement
At the 2011 APEC Leaders meeting in Honolulu, the leaders of the of the (then) nine TPP countries 
agreed to the broad outlines of an agreement. In their statement, they categorized the TPP as “a 
comprehensive, next-generation regional agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and addresses 
new and traditional trade issues and 21st-century challenges.” TPP trade ministers also highlighted the 
following five key areas of the so-called historic and standard-setting agreement. 
• Comprehensive Market Access—Removal of both tariff and non-tariff barriers is 
“comprehensive and ambitious in all areas.” 
• Regional Agreement—Fully regional agreement that facilitates trade and the development of 
production and supply chains among TPP members. 
• Cross-Cutting Trade Issues—Holistic, agreement-wide approach to specific areas: regulatory 
coherence, competitiveness and business facilitation, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and 
development. 
• New Trade Challenges—Addresses emerging trade issues such as those caused by new 
technology (e.g., cloud-computing). 
• Living Agreement—Agreement will “evolve in response to developments in trade, technology or 
other emerging issues” and expand “to include other economies from across the Asia-Pacific 
region.” 
 Source: TPP Leader’s Statement, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 12, 2011. 
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The Evolution of the TPP 
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, as it was originally known, was conceived in 
2003 by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile as a path to trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Brunei joined negotiations in 2005, and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
(P-4) agreement was concluded in 2006. In March 2008, the United States joined the negotiations 
to conclude the still outstanding investment and financial services provisions. President Bush 
notified Congress of his intention to negotiate with the existing P-4 members on September 22, 
2008, and with other countries, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam, on December 30, 2008.  
After a period of reflection on U.S. trade policy, the new Obama Administration decided to 
continue with the TPP negotiations. On November 14, 2009, President Obama committed the 
United States to engage with the TPP countries “with the goal of shaping a regional agreement 
that will have broad-based membership and the high standards worthy of a 21st -century trade 
agreement.”1  
President Obama formally notified Congress of his Administration’s intention to enter into 
negotiations with the TPP countries on December 14, 2009. That notification set off a 90-day 
timeline under the now expired 2002 trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation, for 
congressional consultations prior to the beginning of negotiations.2 In October 2010, TPP 
participants agreed to by consensus to the inclusion of Malaysia as a negotiating partner.  
The negotiating partners announced a framework for the agreement at the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial in Honolulu, HI, November 8-13, 2011. At 
this time, Canada, Japan, and Mexico started to consult with the existing TPP partners on joining 
the negotiations, and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced a 90-day 
comment period for those three countries in Federal Register notices of December 1 and 7, 2011. 
After several months of intense bilateral consultations with each of the current TPP countries, the 
TPP countries agreed by consensus to the inclusion of Mexico and Canada in the talks on June 18 
and 19, 2012, respectively. Mexico and Canada began participating as negotiating partners in the 
December 2012 round in Auckland, New Zealand.  
Alongside Canada and Mexico, Japan expressed a possible interest in joining the TPP 
negotiations and engaged in bilateral consultations with the current participants to investigate that 
possibility. On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced Japan’s definitive interest 
to participate in the TPP and the bilateral consultations intensified. On April 21, the current 
participants announced their support of Japan’s joining the negotiations, and on April 24, the 
Administration notified Congress of its intent to negotiate with Japan in the TPP. Japan began to 
fully participate in the final days of the July 2013 Malaysia round. Eighteen rounds of 
negotiations have taken place with the 19th scheduled for August 23-30, 2013, in Brunei. 
                                                 
1 Remarks of President Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan, November 14, 2009.  
2 Although TPA expired in 2007, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have continued to adhere to its notification 
and consultation requirements. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
The TPP in Context 
If completed as intended, the proposed TPP agreement would strengthen and deepen trade and 
investment ties among its participants. However, it could also have implications in larger, 
strategic contexts beyond the immediate participants: for U.S. trade policy in general; for the 
emerging trade architecture in the Asia-Pacific region; for the multilateral trade regime within the 
WTO; and for U.S strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is perhaps the most ambitious trade negotiation underway in the world. It will break 
new ground on important issues from the challenges of state-owned enterprises, to ensuring the free flow of data 
across borders, to enhancing regional supply chains, to ensuring transparency in cutting red tape. We’re also working 
to strengthen protections for labor and the environment… Our goal is for high standards for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership to enter the bloodstream of the global system and improve the rules and norms. 
—Vice President Joseph P. Biden, April 5, 2013. 
The TPP and U.S. Trade Policy 
U.S. participation in TPP negotiations serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it 
continues and expands a U.S. trade policy strategy that began with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994, of using FTAs to promote trade 
liberalization and potentially to spark multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The George W. Bush Administration expanded the use of this strategy under the rubric of 
“competitive liberalization,” negotiating 11 FTAs with 16 countries. The last three of these 
FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea—were approved by Congress in 2011.3 
However, the future direction of this policy was uncertain, given the low commercial value of 
some of these agreements and lack of new obvious partner countries. Meanwhile, an increasing 
web of bilateral and regional FTAs, were being concluded among other parties in the Asia-Pacific 
region and worldwide. The Bush Administration’s and then the Obama Administration’s adoption 
of the TPP signaled that the United States remains engaged in regional free trade negotiations.  
The TPP arguably provides the United States with the opportunity to project its trade interests by 
negotiating a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA with provisions that build off those in 
FTAs the United States concluded throughout the 2000s, especially the most recent ones. The TPP 
partner countries, while not considered economic powerhouses individually, share a reliance on 
world trade and have been some of the greatest advocates for trade liberalization. While they 
differ in economic levels of development, they have committed themselves to negotiating a high-
standard FTA. That, by itself is not new; the United States has often conducted asymmetrical 
negotiations with countries of differing levels of development in which it has dominated. This 
time, however, with more players at varied levels of development, the United States may not be 
able simply to impose its vision or standards on those countries, and they are likely to make 
demands for concessions from the United States.  
Practically speaking, the TPP approach could eclipse the alternative model of narrower goods-
based FTAs that are offered by China or somewhat more comprehensive agreements used by the 
                                                 
3 The United States now has FTAs in force with 19 countries. These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, South Korea, and Singapore.  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 5 
European Union and Japan that, nonetheless, exclude sensitive agriculture products. Adoption of 
these other models, even if open to U.S. participation, could be seen as disadvantageous to U.S. 
businesses and workers because they exclude provisions important to U.S. commercial trade—
disciplines on services, investment, and intellectual property rights, as well as enforceable 
provisions on labor and environment. In addition, the TPP aims to establish disciplines on new 
trade issues, such as state-owned enterprises or supply chain facilitation that could serve as a 
model for future negotiations bilaterally, regionally, or in the WTO.  
The TPP and Other Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements 
The current 12 TPP countries already form part of a growing network of Asia-Pacific FTAs 
(Figure 2).4 The United States has FTAs in place with six of the TPP countries: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. In addition, the proposed TPP seeks to build on the 
existing Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P-4), a free trade area among Brunei, 
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. The current TPP partners also include 4 of the 10 members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam.5 ASEAN countries have negotiated a free trade area amongst each other as well as 
several external FTAs. All 12 TPP partners are also members of the 21-member Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which does not negotiate FTAs among its membership, 
but serves as a forum for dialogue on and establishes non-binding commitments toward the goals 
of open and free trade and investment within the region.6  
To some, the United States and its TPP partners are jump-starting the consensus-based approach 
of APEC.7 In the context of this forum for dialogue and non-binding commitments, APEC 
Leaders in 2010 agreed to push forward the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). They acknowledged the TPP as potentially one of a number of “ongoing regional 
undertakings” on which to build to eventually achieve an FTAAP.8 Other ongoing regional 
undertakings include potential trade agreements between ASEAN and other Asian countries.  
                                                 
4 See CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, 
by Brock R. Williams. 
5 The 10 ASEAN members are Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
6 APEC consists of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong (officially Hong Kong, China), Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan (officially, Chinese Taipei), Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. The APEC goals are generally referred 
to as the “Bogor Goals” established by APEC Leaders in 1994. 
7 This organization was famously described as “four adjectives in search of a noun” by former Australian Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans, as quoted in “APEC: Successes, Weaknesses, and Future Prospects,” by John McKay, 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 2002, pp. 42-53. 
8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2010 Leaders’ Declaration, November 2010, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/2010_aelm.aspx. 
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Figure 2. Existing FTAs among TPP Countries 
 
Source: WTO FTA database and websites of TPP countries’ trade ministries. Trade data from IMF. 
Notes: Aggregate TPP goods trade, both imports and exports, as reported above. ASEAN also includes 
countries outside the TPP: Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand. TPP 
goods trade covered by existing FTAs as depicted above, reflects all goods trade between FTA partners. This 
measure slightly overstates trade covered under FTAs, as most FTAs exclude market access for at least some 
goods.  
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Most recently, officials announced the launch of negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). This agreement would join ASEAN and its six FTA partners—
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—in one collective FTA. It is 
unclear how these two regional undertakings, RCEP and TPP, may impact one another and how 
they will affect the potential for an FTAAP.9 The RCEP may not aim for the same level of 
ambition in terms of tariff reduction and trade liberalization as the TPP. By allowing sensitive 
items to be left out of the negotiations, this platform could be more appealing to countries less 
inclined to the declared if yet unrealized high-standard ambitions of the TPP. 
Yet, several countries, including Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
Vietnam, are moving forward as negotiating partners in both the TPP and RCEP. The TPP 
partners, including the United States, have also expressed an interest in expanding the TPP to 
additional countries across the Asia-Pacific region. They maintain that new members are 
welcome so long as they strive for the same level of trade liberalization as the current negotiating 
partners. 
During the Auckland round in December 2012, Canada and Mexico participated in the 
negotiations for the first time, thus completing their year-long quest to join the talks. Since then, 
Japan’s request to join the TPP has been accepted by all the members and they are expected to 
participate in the next negotiating round in July 2013. There is as yet no formal limit to the 
potential membership of the TPP, aside from excluding those countries unwilling to commit to the 
ambition of the proposed FTA. As mentioned, all current members of the TPP negotiations are 
also members of APEC, and the current TPP countries have publically stated that membership 
expansion will likely focus on other APEC members first, such as South Korea, though other non-
APEC countries with a strong focus on trade liberalization, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, 
have also expressed an interest in joining TPP. 
Many policy observers, however, note the absence of China, the region and world’s second-
largest economy, from ongoing negotiations. The degree to which a potential TPP agreement and 
its participants are prepared to include China, as well as China’s willingness or interest in 
participating in a comprehensive, high-standard agreement, will help determine if the TPP truly 
has the potential to become an FTAAP. With the agreement’s focus on expansion throughout the 
region, the current negotiating partners may wish to establish disciplines now on certain aspects 
of the Chinese and other Asia-Pacific economies. This may, in part, explain the push for potential 
new disciplines on state-owned enterprises inside the TPP. 
The TPP and the WTO 
Though structured as a regional agreement, the TPP may have an impact on the multilateral 
process of the WTO and the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) of multilateral trade 
negotiations. While the WTO ministers continue to discuss a Doha Round agenda that critics 
                                                 
9 A recent quantitative study by the East-West Center and the Peterson Institute considers the possibility of TPP and 
ASEAN+ agreements simultaneously expanding in the Asia-Pacific and models the welfare gains from each agreement 
eventually leading to an FTAAP. Due to the assumption that the TPP agreement would involve greater liberalization, 
the model predicts greater welfare benefits from an FTAAP based on the TPP. See Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, 
and Fan Zhai, The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Policy Analyses in International Economics, November 2012. 
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contend is increasingly irrelevant to the present trading system, the TPP represents a way for the 
United States and its partners to advance discussions of a “21st-century trade agenda.”  
The influence of the TPP impact could be great due to its potential expansion and, hence, the fact 
that it could eventually affect a substantial amount of world trade—over 60% of U.S. trade alone 
is with other APEC members. The debate over whether FTAs have a positive or negative effect on 
the multilateral system continues. Proponents of bilateral and regional agreements would argue 
that10  
• successful negotiation and implementation of proposed new trade rules in the 
TPP, on such emerging issues as State-owned enterprises and regulatory 
coherence, could serve as a template for future WTO negotiations;  
• a successful TPP agreement among the current negotiating partners could cause 
other regional economies to consider joining (as seen recently with the addition 
of Canada, Japan, and Mexico) in order to ensure they remain competitive in TPP 
markets, thus furthering the WTO goal of greater global trade liberalization; and 
• TPP could help promote and ensure the longevity of domestic economic policy 
reforms, particularly for countries such as Vietnam.  
Opponents, however, would counter that 
• efforts toward the TPP and other regional/bilateral FTAs may divert attention and 
resources from multilateral WTO efforts; 
• increased trade among TPP members due to the preferential tariff structures of 
the agreement could simply be diverted from other regions rather than be newly 
created; and 
• the spread of FTAs may actually make international commerce more difficult as 
companies must navigate varying rules and standards associated with different 
agreements.11 
This last issue of overlapping trade rules may be particularly relevant for the potential TPP 
agreement as it will encompass countries with numerous existing FTAs. The proposed TPP 
agreement could add another layer of complexity or it could simplify the existing trade rules in 
the region by unifying them under one agreement. For example, according to the USTR, the TPP 
countries have committed to establishing a common set of rules of origin for determining whether 
a product originates inside the TPP.12 How these and other trade rules inside the potential TPP 
agreement relate to those in existing FTAs will be of interest moving forward.  
                                                 
10 These arguments regarding FTAs have been placed in a TPP context, but are drawn largely from Jeffrey J. Schott, 
“Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System,” in Free Trade Agreements US Strategies and 
Priorities, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott (Institute for International Economics, 2004). 
11 This is the so-called “spaghetti bowl” effect of FTAs put forward by Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics and 
Law at Columbia University. His view on the TPP agreement is expressed in his op-ed article on the Project Syndicate 
website at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bhagwati20/English.  
12 USTR, “Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” fact sheet, November 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement. 
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Trade Promotion Authority
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—formerly fast track—is a statutory mechanism under which Congress defines 
negotiating objectives and consultative procedures for trade agreements, and authorizes the President to enter into 
reciprocal trade agreements governing tariff and non-tariff barriers. Under TPA, implementing bills for reciprocal 
trade agreements are considered under expedited legislative procedures, that is, limited debate, no amendments, and 
an up-or-down vote. The expedited consideration is conditioned on the President observing certain statutory 
obligations in negotiating trade agreements, including notifying and consulting Congress. The purpose of TPA is to 
preserve the constitutional role of Congress to regulate foreign commerce in consideration of implementing 
legislation for trade agreements that require changes in domestic law, while also bolstering the negotiating credibility 
of the executive branch by assuring that a trade agreement, once signed, will not be changed during the legislative 
process. TPA expired in 2007 and, as of this writing, has not been renewed by Congress.13  
The TPP and the “Rebalance” in the Asia-Pacific Region 
The centerpiece of our economic rebalancing is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-a high-
standard agreement the United States is crafting with Asia-Pacific economies from Chile and 
Peru to New Zealand and Singapore.[ ... ] We always envisioned the TPP as a growing 
platform for regional economic integration. Now, we are realizing that vision-growing the 
number of TPP partners from seven when President Obama took office to four more: 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada and Mexico. –Thomas Donilon, U.S. National Security Adviser, 
March 11, 2013 
The TPP could have implications beyond U.S. economic interests in the Asia-Pacific. The region 
has become increasingly viewed as of vital strategic importance to the United States. Throughout 
the post-World War II period, the region has served as an anchor of U.S. strategic relationships, 
first in the containment of communism and more recently as a counterweight to the rise of China. 
This trend has recently been accentuated by the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” along 
with the perception that the center of gravity of U.S. foreign, economic, and military policy is 
shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP is viewed as an important element in the U.S. 
“rebalancing” toward Asia.14 
U.S.-TPP Economic and Trade Relations15 
The overall economic impact of the potential TPP agreement will depend on a number of factors, 
including the extent of the liberalization achieved in the agreement, as well as the current level 
and potential growth of trade and investment with TPP members. On both measures, the TPP 
appears significant given that the TPP region accounts for a large share of U.S. trade and TPP 
negotiators have expressed their intent to achieve a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA that 
will broadly liberalize regional trade and investment. From the U.S. perspective, a significant 
share of this liberalization has already occurred due to existing U.S. FTAs with 6 of the 11 TPP 
partners (Figure 3), although potential disciplines in areas not covered in previous FTAs may be 
significant for some sectors.  
                                                 
13 For more information, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in 
Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
14 For more information, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” 
Toward Asia, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin. 
15 For more information, see CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and 
Economic Analysis, by Brock R. Williams. 
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Japan’s entry, however, has changed this dynamic somewhat. Without Japan in the agreement, 
only 5% of total U.S.-TPP trade in 2012 was with countries not party to an existing U.S. FTA 
(and hence with greater scope for trade liberalization with the United States); with Japan in the 
agreement that number rises to 20% for U.S.-TPP merchandise trade, and even further to 32% for 
U.S.-TPP services trade. As a high-income country, U.S.-Japan trade differs considerably from 
U.S. trade with the other, mostly lower income negotiating partners without U.S. FTAs. Hence, 
Japan’s participation in the agreement has drawn the interest of a wide range of U.S. industries, 
including sectors like agriculture, automotive, and insurance. 
Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out in terms of their current trade and investment with the 
United States and their potential for future growth. Together these countries have a population of 
over 120 million and their economies have experienced rapid growth in recent years.16 Moreover, 
Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s average applied MFN tariffs—the average tariff on imports from other 
members of the WTO, such as the United States—are 6.5% and 9.8%, respectively, two of the 
highest levels among TPP members (Figure 6). 
Key U.S.-TPP Trade Statistics
• TPP countries collectively represent, the largest U.S. trading partner, accounting for 40% of total U.S. goods trade 
• U.S. FTAs already exist with several U.S. trading partners among TPP participants, particularly Canada and Mexico, 
which account for 72% of U.S. goods trade with TPP partners; and 
• the agreement has the potential to expand in an economically important region and most recently, has expanded to 
include Japan, a country without an existing U.S.-FTA and which accounted for 6% of all U.S. goods trade in 2012 and 
7% of all U.S. services trade in 2011. 
Figure 3. U.S.-World, APEC, and TPP Goods Trade 
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Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from the International Trade Commission. 
                                                 
16 Vietnam’s GDP growth has slowed somewhat relative to the high rates it achieved during the past decade. In 2012 its 
growth rate was 5.0%, according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, compared to an 
average growth rate of 7.3% in the period 2001-2010. 
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U.S.-TPP Trade—Aggregate Overview 
Total U.S. trade with TPP countries was more than $1.5 trillion in merchandise in 2012 and more 
than $242 billion in services in 2011. Even before Canada and Mexico became negotiating 
partners in the TPP, the agreement had the potential to become the second-largest U.S. FTA by 
trade flows. Now with the NAFTA countries and Japan participating, the TPP has the potential to 
become the largest U.S. FTA (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
The current group of 12 countries is diverse in population, geographic location, and economic 
development, and U.S. trade relations with the countries reflect this diversity. The major U.S. 
merchandise exports are fairly similar to most TPP countries and include motor vehicles and 
parts; petroleum and coal products; computer equipment, semiconductors, and electronic 
components; agriculture and construction machinery; and aircraft. However, the top U.S. 
merchandise imports vary greatly by country. Agriculture and natural resources products are key 
U.S. imports from Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and Peru, while apparel products are the main 
U.S. imports from Vietnam. Canada and Mexico are both major suppliers of crude oil to the 
United States, but they also supply manufactured products like motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts. U.S. imports from Malaysia and Singapore consist primarily of manufactured products such 
as computers, semiconductors, and electronic components. Motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts make up over 35% of U.S. goods imports from Japan. 
In terms of value, Canada and Mexico are by far the largest U.S. trading partners among TPP 
countries in goods, and both are significant U.S. services trade and investment partners. Both 
countries share a large border with the United States and are among the oldest U.S. FTA partners. 
Japan is the third-largest U.S.-TPP goods trade partner, and second-largest services trade and 
investment partner. Considering the other eight TPP partners, Singapore and Australia are the top 
U.S. goods export markets and top overall services trade and investment partners with the United 
States, while Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore are the top sources of U.S. goods imports. 
Figure 4. Largest U.S. FTA’s - Goods 
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Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from ITC. 
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Figure 5. Largest U.S. FTAs - Services 
(in billions of U.S. dollars, 2011) 
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Source: Analysis by CRS. Data from BEA. 
Notes: Services trade data not available for all FTA partners. 
U.S.-TPP Trade—Bilateral Trends17 
Twelve countries, including highly developed economies such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and 
New Zealand; middle income countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Malaysia; and emerging 
economies such as Vietnam are potential U.S. FTA partners in the TPP. This section provides a 
snapshot of each country’s economic relationship with the United States and key bilateral 
negotiating topics. The appendix includes additional information on bilateral trade flows between 
the United States and TPP countries (Table A-1 and Table A-2).  
Australia 
Total goods trade between the United States and Australia was $38.8 billion in 2012, while U.S.-
Australia services trade totaled $22.4 billion in 2011. It is the third-largest U.S. trading partner in 
services behind Canada and Mexico. The U.S. trade surplus with Australia in 2012 was the largest 
of any TPP country for goods ($21.7 billion) and the third-largest in services in 2011 ($9.8 
billion). Part of this large surplus is due to quickly growing exports to Australia in both goods and 
services over the past decade. From January 1, 2005, when the Australian-U.S. FTA (AUSFTA) 
took effect, through 2011, U.S. agricultural exports to Australia more than doubled to $200 
million. The primary U.S. goods exports to Australia are machinery, vehicles, and optical/medical 
instruments, while the top U.S. imports are meat, precious stones/metals, and optical/medical 
                                                 
17 The data for this section comes from the International Trade Commission’s trade database and the World Trade 
Organization’s Country Trade Profiles. 
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instruments. Fuels and mining products make up the bulk of the Australia’s exports to the rest of 
the world. 
• The U.S.-Australian FTA (AUSFTA) took effect in 2005 and as a result most 
goods are or will eventually be exchanged tariff-free.18 
• The AUSFTA does not contain an investor-state dispute mechanism, a prominent 
feature in bilateral and regional FTAs the United States has negotiated and a U.S. 
negotiating objective in the TPP talks. Australia has reportedly insisted on an opt-
out from such a provision if it is included in a final TPP agreement. 
• Australia may seek additional access for its sugar, which was excluded from 
AUSFTA. Australia may also seek to speed up the trade liberalization schedules 
for its beef and dairy products into the U.S. market. USTR maintains that it will 
not re-open the market access negotiations of AUSFTA. 
Brunei 
Brunei is by far the smallest U.S. trading partner among TPP countries. In 2012, total goods trade 
between the United States and Brunei was $243 million. U.S. imports from Brunei have declined 
considerably over the past decade. In 2012, they were only $86 million, a fraction of their 2005 
level of $562 million. The top U.S. imports from Brunei are oil and oil products. These products 
are crucial to Brunei’s economy, where fuel and mining products make up over 96% of total 
exports. The United States exports primarily machinery and aircraft to Brunei. 
• The United States does not currently have an FTA with Brunei. 
• Brunei remained on the USTR IPR “watch list” in 2012, due to U.S. concern 
over intellectual property rights enforcement.19 
Canada 
Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States, overall and among TPP participants 
with total trade in goods of over $616 billion (2012) and total trade in services of $84.1 billion 
(2011).20 The U.S. trade deficit with Canada has been falling in recent years to $32.5 billion in 
2012. The United States recorded a substantial trade surplus in services trade with Canada of $28 
billion in 2011. Although rich in natural resources and energy, Canada is also part of an integrated 
North American supply chain and exchanges many manufactured products with the United States, 
especially autos, at different stages of production.  
                                                 
18 For more information on AUSFTA, see CRS Report RL32375, The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: 
Provisions and Implications, by William H. Cooper. 
19 U.S. Trade Representative, 2012 Special 301 Report, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf. Brunei, p. 42. Placement of a trading partner on the Priority Watch List or 
Watch List indicates that particular problems exist in that country with respect to IPR protection, enforcement, or 
market access for persons relying on intellectual property. Countries placed on the Priority Watch List are the focus of 
increased bilateral attention concerning IPR protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on 
intellectual property. 
20 For additional information, see CRS Report RL33087, United States-Canada Trade and Economic Relationship: 
Prospects and Challenges, by Ian F. Fergusson. 
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• The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement entered into force on January 1, 
1989, and was incorporated into NAFTA on January 1, 1994. As a result, nearly 
all trade is conducted tariff and restriction free between the two countries, and 
with Mexico. 
• Canada’s willingness to negotiate over its supply management programs for dairy 
and poultry were reported to be an obstacle for the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand to allow Canada’s participation in the TPP.  
• For the past several years, the U.S. Trade Representative has placed Canada on 
its “priority watch list” of countries meriting bilateral attention over intellectual 
property rights enforcement.21 Just prior to joining the talks in June 2012, the 
Canadian House of Commons passed copyright modernization legislation.  
Chile 
U.S. trade with Chile has been growing over the past decade with U.S. exports more than 
quadrupling to nearly $18.9 billion in 2012 from the advent of the U.S.-Chile FTA in 2004. Total 
U.S. services trade with Chile was $4.2 billion in 2011. As with Australia and Brunei, Chile’s 
major exports to the world are fuel and mining products, particularly copper. However, it also has 
a well-developed agriculture sector, which contributes to exports. Manufactured goods make up 
over 60% of its world imports. Chile-U.S. trade mirrors these world patterns. The top U.S. 
imports from Chile are copper, fruits/nuts, and seafood. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Chile consist 
mostly of machinery, refined oil products, and vehicles. The United States is a major trading 
partner for the country, providing about 17% of Chile’s total imports. 
• The U.S.-Chile FTA entered into force on January 1, 2004, and as a result most 
goods are or will eventually be exchanged tariff-free.22 
• Despite welcoming Chile’s “significant commitment” to address outstanding 
intellectual property rights (IPR) issues under the U.S.-Chile FTA, the country 
remained on the United States “Special 301” ‘priority watch list’ of countries 
meriting bilateral attention.23 
Japan24 
Japan participated in the TPP talks for the first time in the final days of the Malaysia round in July 
2013. On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan would formally seek to 
participate in the negotiations to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In making the 
decision to seek participation in the TPP, Prime Minister Abe had to confront influential domestic 
interests that argued against the move. Among the most vocal have been Japanese farmers, 
especially rice farmers, and their representatives. They have argued that Japanese agriculture 
would be severely harmed by foreign competition as Japan would have to negotiate away high 
                                                 
21 2012 Special 301 Report, Canada, p. 25. 
22 For more information on this agreement, see CRS Report RL31144, The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: 
Economic and Trade Policy Issues, by J. F. Hornbeck. 
23 2012 Special 301 Report, Chile, p. 26. 
24 For more information, see CRS Report R42676, Japan Joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership: What Are the 
Implications?, by William H. Cooper and Mark E. Manyin. 
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tariffs and other protective measures on imports of agricultural products. Some Japanese health 
providers have argued that Japan’s national health insurance system would be adversely affected 
because, they claim, the TPP would force Japanese citizens to buy foreign-produced 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In his March 15 statement, Prime Minister Abe 
acknowledged those domestic sensitivities, but also insisted that Japan needed to take advantage 
of “this last window of opportunity” to enter the negotiations, if it is to grow economically.25 
Other Japanese business interests, including manufacturers, strongly support the TPP.  
U.S. and Japanese engagement in informal discussions dated from November 2011 when the 
government of then-Prime Minister Noda first expressed interest in the possibility of seeking to 
join the TPP negotiations. At that time, the Obama Administration identified three issues that 
Japan needed to address as “confidence building measures” if the United States were to support 
Japan’s entry into the TPP: Japanese restrictions on imports of U.S. beef, market access for U.S.-
made cars, and insurance and express delivery issues. After further consultations with Japan 
following Prime Minister Abe’s announcement, then acting USTR Demetrios Marantis 
announced that the United States would support Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations on 
April 12, 2013, subject to the consensus of all the TPP participants.26 
The beef issue appears to have been addressed with the February 1, 2013, Japanese action to 
allow imports of U.S. beef from cattle younger than 30 months. The issue first arose in December 
2003 when Japan imposed a ban on imported U.S. beef (as did some other countries) in response 
to the discovery of the first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow 
disease”) in Washington State. Japan had loosened restrictions to allow imports of beef from 
cattle younger than 20 months, but the United States had pressed Japan to loosen the restrictions 
even further. 
The auto issue stems from the low volume of Japanese imports of cars made by the three Detroit-
based automakers—Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors—for which they cite Japanese taxes, 
safety and environment regulations, insurance, and other non-tariff barriers. As a result of these 
discussions, Japan agreed to increase the number of U.S.-made vehicles that can be imported 
under its Preferential Handling Procedure (PHP) from 2,000 per vehicle “type” to 5,000 per 
vehicle “type.” In addition, the two countries agreed to address in parallel negotiations issues 
regarding non-tariff measures (NTMs) pertaining to auto trade, including transparency in 
regulations, standards, certification, “green” and other new technology vehicles, and distribution. 
The parallel auto negotiations are also to address the establishment of a special “safeguard” 
provision to deal with injurious surges in auto imports and of a special tariff “snap-back” 
mechanism to deal with a partner’s failure to fulfill the commitments on auto trade. Japan agreed 
that under the proposed TPP, U.S. tariffs on imports of Japanese motor vehicles will be phased 
out over a period equal to the longest phase-out period in the agreement.27 
The activities of the government-run Japan Post, subsidiaries of which sell insurance and express 
delivery services, were the main focus of USTR’s agreement with Japan on insurance. Japan 
                                                 
25 BNA International Trade Daily, March 18, 2013. 
26 “Statement by Acting U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis Regarding Japan and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,” April 12, 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/april/amb-marantis-japan-
tpp. 
27 See USTR, “Towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership: U.S. Consultations with Japan,” April 12, 2013, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/04132013%20Japan%20OVERVIEW%20factsheet%20FINAL_1.pdf. 
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announced that the government would not approve new or modified cancer insurance products or 
stand-alone medical insurance products for sale by Japan Post until it has been determined that a 
“level-playing field” has been established in competition between private insurers and Japan Post. 
The countries agreed to address additional “level-playing field” issues regarding insurance in the 
actual TPP negotiations. 
Furthermore, the two sides agreed to hold negotiations parallel to the TPP negotiations to address 
issues regarding non-tariff measures (NTMs) in insurance, government procurement, competition 
policy, express delivery, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. The parallel negotiations 
are to achieve “tangible and meaningful” results by the completion of the main TPP negotiations 
and will be legally binding at the time a TPP agreement would enter into force.  
As indicated earlier, TPP is the leading U.S. trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration 
and a core component of Administration efforts to “rebalance” U.S. foreign policy priorities 
toward the Asia-Pacific region by playing a more active role in shaping the region’s rules and 
norms. As the second largest economy in Asia, the third largest economy in the world, and a key 
link in global supply/production chains, Japan’s participation would be pivotal to enhancing the 
credibility and viability of the TPP as a regional free trade arrangement. It might also encourage 
other Asian countries to join. 
Japan’s membership in the TPP with the United States would constitute a de facto U.S.-Japan 
FTA. A large segment of the U.S. business community has expressed support for Japanese 
participation in the TPP, if Japan can resolve long-standing issues on access to its markets for 
U.S. goods, services, and agriculture. However, the Detroit-based U.S. auto industry, the United 
Autoworkers union, and Members of Congress with a large auto-industry presence in their 
districts have expressed strong opposition. Other segments of the U.S. business community have 
expressed support for Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, although some have conditioned 
their support on Japan’s willingness to address long-standing issues. 
Japan’s bid to join the TPP presents both risks and opportunities for both Japan and the United 
States. On the one hand, a TPP agreement that achieves its stated ambition and includes Japan 
could reinvigorate an economic relationship that has remained steady but stagnant, by forcing the 
two countries to address long-standing, difficult issues, and allowing them to raise their 
relationship to a higher level. On the other hand, failure could indicate that the underlying 
problems are too fundamental to overcome and could set back the relationship. It could signify 
the failure of the United States and/or Japan to deal with domestic opposition to a more open 
trade relationship. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia is the fifth-largest U.S. goods trading partner among TPP countries, totaling nearly $39 
billion in 2012. U.S. services trade with Malaysia was $3.9 billion in 2011. The United States 
imports nearly twice as much as it exports to Malaysia, resulting in a large goods trade deficit of 
nearly $13.1 billion in 2012. Over the past decade, U.S. imports from Malaysia have been 
somewhat volatile, though declining considerably in the past five years. From 2000 to 2006, 
imports increased from $25 billion to over $35 billion, then fell back to $25.9 billion in 2012. 
Electrical machinery makes up nearly half of all U.S. imports from, and exports to, Malaysia. 
Some of this trade comprises the same product category flowing both in and out of the United 
States and may represent intermediate goods crossing borders at various stages of production. 
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• The United States and Malaysia previously engaged in FTA negotiations. Those 
negotiations stalled in 2008 due to disagreements over government procurement 
practices among other issues.28 
• In the TPP negotiations, Malaysia may seek additional access to the U.S. market 
for sugar and dairy products that now are subject to U.S. tariff-rate quotas.  
• In 2012, Malaysia was dropped from the U.S. IPR watch list signifying 
legislative and regulatory improvements to the country’s IPR regime.29 
Mexico 
Mexico is the third-largest trading partner of the United States, and the second-largest among the 
TPP participant countries.30 Total U.S.-Mexico goods trade was $494 billion in 2012 while 
services trade between the two countries was $40 billion in 2011. Although Mexico’s reliance on 
the United States as an export market has diminished slightly, the United States remains Mexico’s 
largest trading partner by far. Among the TPP participants, the United States has its largest goods 
trade deficit with Mexico ($61.3 billion) in 2012, but carried a large services surplus ($11.5 
billion) in 2011. As with Canada, Mexico is part of an integrated North American manufacturing 
supply chain and exchanges goods with the United States—and Canada—at different stages of 
production. 
• NAFTA came into effect between Canada, Mexico, and the United States on 
January 1, 1994. As a result, nearly all trade between the three countries is now 
conducted duty and barrier free.31 
• The TPP negotiations may provide a venue for addressing additional issues, such 
as reconsideration of Mexico’s exclusion of foreign investment in its petroleum 
industry. 
• The prospect of enhancing disciplines in a TPP agreement to address sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) issues and non-tariff barriers would be welcomed by U.S. 
agricultural exporters. They have complained that Mexico has held up shipments 
without providing justification based on “sound science” and imposed 
burdensome prior inspection requirements. 
New Zealand 
U.S. trade with New Zealand was relatively small among TPP members in 2012, larger only than 
Brunei, with total goods trade of $6.7 billion and total services trade of $3.9 billion (2011). U.S.-
New Zealand trade is relatively balanced with a small U.S. trade deficit in goods in 2012 ($216 
million) and a small U.S. trade surplus in services in 2011 ($301 million). With the rest of the 
world, New Zealand primarily exports agricultural products and imports manufactured goods. Its 
                                                 
28 For more information, see CRS Report RL33445, The Proposed U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, by Michael 
F. Martin. 
29 USTR, 2012 Special 301 Report, Malaysia, p. 8.  
30 See CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications , by M. Angeles 
Villarreal. 
31 For more information on NAFTA issues related to Mexico, see CRS Report RL34733,  NAFTA and the Mexican 
Economy, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
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trade with the United States is quite similar to its world pattern with top exports to the United 
States in meat, dairy, and beverages, and imports from the United States in aircraft and 
machinery. 
• The United States does not currently have an FTA with New Zealand, but New 
Zealand has long sought an FTA and improved access to the large U.S. market. 
• The United States has expressed concern that the practices and procedures of the 
New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac) put “innovative 
pharmaceutical products,” often made in the United States, at a disadvantage to 
older, generic products.  
• Increased dairy market access in the United States is both a top priority for New 
Zealand and a chief concern among U.S. dairy interests. 
Peru 
The U.S. trade relationship with Peru is similar to that of its Latin American neighbor, Chile, 
though on a smaller scale. U.S.-Peru trade totaled $15.8 billion in goods in 2012. Relative to 
other TPP countries, Peru is the third-smallest U.S. trade partner, in front of New Zealand and 
Brunei. The United States had a goods trade surplus with Peru of $2.9 billion in 2012, with U.S. 
exports to Peru increasing four-fold over the past decade. The major U.S. imports from Peru are 
oil and oil products, copper, and knitted apparel, whereas the major U.S. exports to Peru are 
machinery, refined oils, and electrical machinery. As with Chile, the United States is a major 
trading partner with Peru, providing nearly 20% of the country’s total imports.  
• The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (an FTA) entered into force 
on February 1, 2009.32 As a result, nearly all trade between the two countries is or 
will soon be conducted tariff and restriction free. 
• In its FTA with the United States, Peru agreed to IPR provisions—known as the 
May 10th agreement—that reflected certain lasting U.S. concerns regarding 
accessibility to medicines. The IPR chapter proposed by the United States in the 
TPP negotiations reportedly reflects prior U.S. FTA provisions. Peru has 
expressed concerns that the new provisions would require it to adopt stricter 
patent protections, and would negate the previous FTA provisions.33 
• Peru remains on the U.S. IPR watch list due to concerns over the “widespread 
availability of counterfeit and pirated products in Peru” and its need to devote 
additional resources to IPR enforcement, among other issues.34 
Singapore 
Among TPP members, Singapore is a large U.S. trading partner in both goods and services. Total 
U.S.-Singapore trade was $50.8 billion in goods and $14.9 billion in services in 2012 and 2011, 
respectively. The United States had a large surplus with Singapore in both goods ($10.3 billion) 
                                                 
32 For more information, see CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
33 “USTR Says New TPP IPR Approach Still Achieves Goals Of ‘May 10’ Deal,” Inside U.S. Trade, October 28, 2011.  
34 USTR, 2012 Special 301 Report, Peru, p. 48. 
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and services ($6 billion), in the most recent year for which data is available. Singapore imports 
primarily business/professional/technical services from the United States, unlike most countries 
whose services imports from the United States are mostly in travel/transportation. As an 
important trade and transshipment hub, Singapore’s world goods trade is dominated by 
manufactured goods, comprising over 70% of exports and 65% of imports. The United States’ 
goods trade with Singapore, as with Malaysia, is also mostly manufactured goods, primarily 
machinery and electrical machinery. 
• The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement entered into force on 
January 1, 2004.35 As a result, nearly all their trade is conducted tariff and 
restriction free. 
• Due to the importance of State-owned enterprises (SOE) in Singapore’s 
economy, its FTA with the United States contained provisions relating to SOEs. 
The United States is seeking further disciplines on SOEs in the TPP to ensure 
private actors can compete equally with state-backed entities. Temasek, 
Singapore’s investment holding company, reportedly has concerns that the 
disciplines proposed by the United States may put it at a disadvantage relative to 
private actors.36 
Vietnam 
Vietnam’s trade with the United States has increased rapidly over the past decade to $24.9 billion 
in goods in 2012. At least part of this increase is due to changes in the formal U.S.-Vietnamese 
trade relationship. In 2001, the United States granted Vietnam conditional normal trade relations, 
increasing that status to permanent normal trade relations in 2006 with Vietnam’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).37 While U.S. trade with Vietnam has increased in both 
directions, imports have risen much faster than exports. Hence, the United States had a relatively 
large ($15.6 billion) goods trade deficit with Vietnam in 2012. Vietnam supplies the United States 
with mostly labor-intensive products such as knitted and woven apparel. Meanwhile, its top U.S. 
imports are relatively more high-tech goods, including machinery and vehicles.  
• There is no FTA currently in effect between the United States and Vietnam. 
• Due to the high volume of U.S. imports of Vietnamese apparel and footwear, 
better market access in these areas is likely a top priority for Vietnam in the 
negotiations. Vietnam is seeking “cut and sew” rules of origin that would allow it 
to source textile inputs from non-TPP countries and still receive the preferences 
established under the TPP. Certain segments of the U.S. textile and apparel 
industry, meanwhile, have expressed their opposition to making such concessions 
to Vietnam in the negotiations. 
• Vietnam reportedly has held off engaging in bilateral market access talks with the 
United States until U.S. negotiators show flexibility on crafting rules of origin for 
its textile and apparel exports. It has indicated it would not further open up its 
                                                 
35 For more information, see CRS Report RL31789, The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, by Dick K. Nanto, and 
CRS Report RL34315, The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement: Effects After Five Years, by Dick K. Nanto. 
36 “U.S. SOE Proposal Raises Ire of Singapore State-Owned Investment Firm,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 13, 2012. 
37 For more information, see CRS Report R41550, U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade Relations: Issues for the 113th 
Congress, by Michael F. Martin. 
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market to U.S. agricultural products if there is no change in the U.S. position. 
This concerns U.S. agricultural interests, which view this country as the most 
promising market among all current TPP participants. Progress on other U.S. 
negotiating objectives with Vietnam likely will depend also upon how both sides 
address the rules of origin issue. 
• As mentioned above, the United States is seeking disciplines on SOEs to address 
possible unfair competitive advantages. Vietnam has publically expressed 
concerns over the proposed U.S. negotiating text on SOEs, and with SOEs 
accounting for perhaps 40% of its GDP, it is the country most likely to challenge 
the United States on its proposal.38 
• Additional issues regarding Vietnamese trade relations include U.S. restrictions 
on Vietnamese seafood and the United States’ continued designation of Vietnam 
as a “non-market economy.” While Vietnam has made large strides in liberalizing 
its economy and has been granted WTO membership, criticism of its standards 
on labor rights, intellectual property protection, and corruption has persisted in 
various quarters.  
• Vietnam remains on the United States’ IPR watch list due, in part, to the 
continued existence of widespread counterfeiting and piracy, including internet 
piracy.39 
 
                                                 
38 “Vietnam Rejects U.S. Push on State Firms in Trade Talks,” The Financial Express, October 30, 2011.  
39 USTR, 2012 Special 301 Report, Vietnam, p. 50. 
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Core Negotiating Issues: 
Market Access 
Market access for goods, services, and 
agriculture often form the crux of FTA 
negotiations. However, non-tariff barriers 
such as technical barriers to trade and sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards, while considered 
rules, also have an impact on market access. 
Negotiations on these latter issues are 
designed to ensure that, as tariff barriers are 
reduced, they are not replaced by other forms 
of protection.  
Market Access for Goods and 
Services 
A fundamental element of most FTAs is 
commitments among FTA partners to 
eliminate most, if not all, tariffs and quotas on 
their trade in goods. Current average MFN 
tariff levels for TPP countries vary from 0% 
to nearly 10% (Figure 6). The TPP will 
include tariff phase-out schedules that cover 
more than 11,000 commodity categories for 
each of the partner countries. At their November 2011 meeting in Honolulu, the TPP trade 
ministers stated that they are aiming for duty-free access for trade in goods. The tariff schedules 
will likely provide for phase-out of tariffs, with tariffs on many products phased-out immediately 
when the agreement enters into force, and tariffs on more sensitive products phased out over 
varying periods of time. All of the current TPP countries are in the process of some tariff 
elimination as each has an FTA with one or more of the other TPP partners. As mentioned above, 
the United States has free trade agreements with Australia, Peru, Singapore, and Chile, and the 
original P-4 countries have already negotiated FTA provisions among themselves. The TPP may 
build on these previous commitments and harmonize tariff elimination for all members. TPP 
partners are also discussing provisions that deal with export and import licensing procedures, 
customs issues, and trade facilitation. 
Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear 
Differences are likely to arise between the developed countries and some of the developing 
countries, including Vietnam, over elimination of tariffs on labor-intensive products, such as 
textiles and apparel and footwear. The United States, for example, has included in its FTAs, long 
tariff phase-out periods, special safeguards, and restrictive rules of origin (see below) to protect 
U.S. domestic producers from the adverse effects of import-sensitive products. For example, 
Figure 6. Average MFN Applied Tariffs 
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Source: WTO Tariff Profiles, 2012. 
Notes: These are the WTO-wide average MFN 
applied tariff rates, and hence do not reflect FTA tariff 
rates (e.g. the average tariff applied to U.S. exports to 
Canada and Mexico would be much lower due to 
NAFTA). * Signifies data from 2010. 
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certain U.S. footwear manufacturers have argued for maintaining high tariffs on imported 
footwear, while Vietnam is pressing for lower tariffs to gain greater access to the U.S. market.40 
Developing countries have argued that they need preferential access to the large markets in order 
to compete with producers from other countries, such as China.41  
Trade in Services 
A high priority for the United States in its negotiations of bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements has been increased market access for services providers, especially financial services, 
including insurance and banking; professional services, including legal services and private 
educational services; telecommunication services; express delivery; and e-commerce (see e-
commerce section below). In doing so, the United States has sought to expand on modest 
commitments that trade partners have made in the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), especially in light of the perceived failure of 
WTO partners to expand on those commitments in the now dormant Doha Round. 
U.S. FTAs with TPP partners Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore already 
cover trade in services. Although these countries cover more than half of U.S.-TPP services trade, 
Japan is also a major U.S.-services trade partner so its entry has increased the significance of 
these provisions. Moreover, innovations regarding trade in services is a key part of the Obama 
Administration’s vision of the TPP as a “21st -century model” for trade agreements, and the 
United States seeks TPP services provisions to be as broad as possible to cover trade with future 
entrants. 
Cross-border Services  
According to the agreed outline, the TPP will cover services trade in several separate chapters, 
with some overlap. The section on cross-border trade in services—in which the buyer and seller 
are located in different territories—will employ the “negative list approach,” (as did the P-4 
agreement), that is the provisions are to apply to all types of services unless specifically excluded 
by a partner country in an annex to the agreement. This approach is generally considered to be 
more comprehensive than the “positive list approach” used in the GATS that requires each 
covered service to be identified. The negative approach also implies that any new type of service 
that is developed after the agreement enters into force is automatically covered unless it is 
specifically excluded. 
Most trade agreements on cross-border services trade, including U.S. FTAs and the original P-4 
agreement, contain basic provisions on services that will likely be part of the TPP:  
• non-discriminatory treatment of services from partner-country providers, 
including national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment;  
• market access—no limitations on the number of service suppliers, the total value 
or volume of services provided, the number of persons employed, or the types of 
legal entities or joint ventures that a foreign service supplier may employ;  
                                                 
40 World Trade Online, March 5, 2012. 
41 For more information, see CRS Report R42772, U.S. Textile Manufacturing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations, by Michaela D. Platzer. 
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• prohibition on requirements that a partner-based service provider maintain a 
commercial presence in the country of the buyer; 
• mutual recognition of professional qualifications for certification of service 
providers; 
• transparency in the development and application of government regulations; and 
• allowance for payments and transfers of capital flows in the provision of 
services.  
In recent FTAs, including KORUS FTA, the United States has made market access of express 
delivery services a priority, which could also be the case in its negotiations on the TPP. Of 
particular concern are cases where a government-owned and operated postal system provides 
express delivery services competing with private sector providers. The KORUS FTA (Annex-12-
B) stipulates that the postal system cannot use its monopoly power in providing postal services to 
give an express delivery subsidiary an unfair advantage. Nor should it divert revenues from its 
postal services to subsidize its express delivery services to the disadvantage of other providers.  
Financial Services 
The draft TPP outline indicates that financial services, including insurance and insurance-related 
services, banking and related services, as well as auxiliary services of a financial nature, will be 
addressed in a separate chapter as in previous FTAs. The original P-4 agreement did not include 
financial services provisions when it came into force in 2006. However, the P-4 partners 
committed to concluding a financial services (and investment) chapter within two years—a 
commitment that was overtaken by the launch of the TPP. The financial services chapter would 
adapt relevant provisions from the foreign investment chapter and the cross-border trade in 
services chapter. The KORUS FTA was the most recent U.S. FTA in which the United States 
negotiated provisions on financial services and which presumably will serve as a model for U.S. 
negotiations of the TPP in this area. The KORUS FTA distinguishes between financial services 
traded across borders and those sold by a provider with a commercial presence in the home 
country of the buyer. In the case of providers with a foreign commercial presence, the KORUS 
FTA applies the negative list approach; in the case of cross-border trade, the KORUS FTA limits 
coverage to specific banking and insurance services.42  
The KORUS FTA and other U.S. FTAs provide that nothing in the FTA would prevent a party to 
the agreement from imposing prudential measures to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. The KORUS FTA also addresses insurance sold by Korea Post, in particular that 
Korea Post is not regulated as other financial institutions. U.S. providers have argued that 
government-owned and operated insurance providers are not regulated as stringently and 
therefore, have a competitive advantage over their privately owned counterparts. The KORUS 
FTA stipulates Korea Post insurance operations would be subject to tighter regulation. Another 
issue of U.S. concern regarding financial services was assurances that a U.S. financial service 
provider located in South Korea would be able to transfer information electronically or by other 
                                                 
42 Regarding insurance, the FTA’s coverage would be limited to cross-border trade in marine, aviation, and transit 
insurance; reinsurance; services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, risk assessment, and actuarial and claim 
settlement services; and insurance intermediation services such as brokerage and agency services. Regarding banking 
and securities, the agreement’s coverage in cross-border trade would be limited to providing financial information and 
data processing, advisory, and other auxiliary financial services.  
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means from the host country where it is required in the ordinary course of business. Such 
information could include accounting information and human resources information that a 
company would want to transfer and process to a central location rather than having to process 
and keep at individual locations. The KORUS FTA indicates that South Korea would comply with 
this commitment two years after the agreement enters into force (2014). Host governments are 
cautious that such transfers of information might violate domestic privacy laws and 
considerations.  
In addition, other chapters in the proposed agreement would affect trade in services because of 
the nature of services and their modes of delivery. Most services require the provider and buyer to 
be co-located, and the largest volume of services trade occurs when the provider has a 
commercial presence in the form of a direct investment in the country of the buyer and sells the 
service to the buyer. Therefore, provisions of the TPP that may pertain to foreign investments 
(discussed elsewhere) relate to trade in services. In addition, many service providers, such as 
sellers of entertainment programming, are intellectual property owners and argue for strong IP 
rights protection, the subject of another chapter in the proposed TPP (and discussed elsewhere). 
Furthermore, most of the barriers to trade in services are in the form of domestic regulations; 
therefore, the cross-cutting objective for regulatory coherence would affect trade in services.  
According to the November 2011 outline, as in previous U.S. FTAs, the TPP will have a separate 
chapter on telecommunications trade. The TPP is to promote access to telecommunications 
networks for foreign services suppliers and transparency of regulations pertaining to 
telecommunications services. Along with these objectives, the United States sought and obtained 
in the KORUS FTA commitments to allow U.S. investment in foreign telecommunications 
companies.  
Negotiations over the services provisions likely will lead to controversy between the developed 
countries, including the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, 
and developing countries. Developed countries have pushed for greater market access for 
services. Developing countries have been more cautious on liberalization in services trade as they 
fear competition in sectors they view as a source of domestic employment and worry about the 
political implications forcing open sectors that are often controlled by politically powerful 
interests. Also, the United States may also be challenged to open its market to providers of 
maritime services. The United States has also been pressed to liberalize access to its market 
through the so-called mode-4 delivery—temporary entry of personnel to provide services. No 
U.S. FTA negotiated after the agreements with Chile and Singapore agreements includes 
provisions on the temporary movement of personnel.   
Government Procurement 
The United States is a member of the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) and has sought the inclusion of government procurement provisions in its FTAs. Among 
TPP partner countries, only Japan and Singapore are members of the GPA, although New Zealand 
announced on August 15, 2012, that it will seek to join the agreement.43 In previous FTA 
negotiations with Malaysia, the United States had sought concessions on government 
procurement, a sensitive area for Malaysia which since 1969 has maintained preferences designed 
                                                 
43 “Press Release: NZ to Join WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement,” August, 15, 2012, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-join-wto%E2%80%99s-govt-procurement-agreement. 
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to assist the ethnic Malay population. U.S. FTAs with Australia, Peru, Chile, Singapore, and 
NAFTA include chapters on government procurement, which provide opportunities for firms of 
each nation to bid on certain federal and state contracts over a set monetary threshold on a 
reciprocal basis. A similar chapter has been proposed by U.S. negotiators in the TPP talks.  
In the 112th Congress, 68 Members of Congress wrote to President Obama to urge the 
Administration not to negotiate government procurement provisions that would limit the 
application of Buy American provisions through extension of government procurement 
opportunities and obligations to TPP partner countries.44 However, Canada reportedly may seek to 
address remaining U.S. Buy American exclusions concerning state and municipal projects funded 
by the federal government through the TPP.45 Supporters argue that the reciprocal nature of the 
government procurement provisions will allow U.S. firms access to major government 
procurement programs overseas. This market potentially could be quite large. According to the 
WTO, government procurement accounts for 15%-20% of a country’s GDP and the size of the 
government procurement market among GPA members was $1.6 trillion in 2008.46  
At the Dallas round of negotiations, the United States reportedly proposed that TPP countries 
negotiate access commitments for central government procurement before addressing sub-federal 
or state level commitments.47 This may be due to resistance among some U.S. states in providing 
access to their procurement markets. States must voluntarily opt in to government procurement 
commitments in FTA, but the number of states doing so has dropped substantially from the 37 
states that signed up to the GPA to 8 states that have acceded to commitments under the most 
recent U.S. bilateral FTAs with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia. However, Canada 
reportedly tabled a proposal during the Singapore round that would obligate sub-federal entities 
to open procurement projects funded by a central government to competition from firms in TPP 
countries.48 
Agriculture 
Most attention in negotiating agricultural provisions in bilateral FTAs focuses on what additional 
market access the United States can secure for its farm commodities and food products in 
prospective partner countries. The outcome is usually reflected in a “National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods” chapter and accompanying detailed tariff-line schedules. However, 
negotiators also address matters in other FTA chapters that affect commerce in agricultural 
products. The TPP agreement will similarly deal with a wide range of agricultural issues as 
described below. 
                                                 
44 Letter available at http://donnaedwards.house.gov/uploads/Buy%20American%20TPP%20Ltr%20to%20Admin.pdf. 
45 “Canada to Push Opening U.S. Government Procurement Contracts at TPP-Source,” Wall Street Journal, February 
21, 2013. 
46 Briefing Note: Government Procurement Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/
brief_gpa_e.htm. 
47 “U.S. Seeks Delay in Addressing Sub-Central Procurement in TPP Talks,” World Trade Online, May 14, 2012. 
48 “In TPP, Canada May Seek Bilateral Deals with U.S. On Procurement, Visas,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 15, 2013. 
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Market Access 
U.S. agriculture has both offensive and defensive interests in the TPP negotiations. Many in the 
U.S. agriculture and the agribusiness/food manufacturing sector view positively the prospect of 
market openings in the three commercially-significant countries with which the United States 
does not yet have an FTA (i.e., Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam). Though Japan currently is the 
fourth largest U.S. agricultural export market, it protects its producers with very high tariffs and 
restrictive quotas. Malaysia and Vietnam, due to their expanding populations and growing 
incomes, likely will continue to fuel demand for consumer-ready U.S. food products. U.S. cotton 
could also see higher demand from Vietnam for its textile sector.  
The U.S. dairy sector, however, has adopted a multi-pronged posture, eyeing opportunities in 
certain markets. At the same time, it is concerned about the competition that New Zealand’s dairy 
exporters would pose if granted preferential access to the U.S. market. The U.S. sugar production 
sector opposes both reopening the sugar market access provisions in any current FTA with a TPP 
country (e.g., Australia), and granting new market access concessions on sugar to any TPP 
participant. 
U.S. agriculture and food processing sectors pressed the Obama Administration to accept Canada, 
Japan, and Mexico as full negotiating participants. They welcomed the decisions made to invite 
Canada and Mexico to join the talks, eyeing the prospect of seeing issues addressed that were not 
considered when the United States negotiated FTAs with each of the two countries. Of the three, 
Japan is viewed as the most promising market for U.S. agriculture. Now that Japan will fully 
participate in the Brunei negotiating round, U.S. agricultural interests are expected to continue to 
advocate for Japan to reduce and/or eliminate over time its high tariffs and restrictive quotas on 
agricultural imports. Japan is expected to push back, as reflected in its initial proposal to be 
presented in this next round that reportedly would seek to exclude any liberalization of its most 
sensitive agricultural commodities (rice, barley, wheat, dairy products, beef, pork, and 
sweeteners).49  
In 2012, two-way U.S. agricultural trade with the other 11 TPP countries totaled $108 billion. 
This represented 44% of the combined total of U.S. agricultural exports and imports with the 
world (Table 1). U.S. agricultural exports to these 11 countries totaled $59 billion in 2012, and 
accounted for 42% of all such exports worldwide. Of these, Canada ranked first, followed by 
Mexico and Japan. TPP partners also are significant sources of U.S. agricultural imports, 
accounting for 48% of such imports from the entire world. Looked at another way, shipments 
from four countries—Canada, Mexico, Australia, and Chile—accounted for 85% of the $49 
billion in U.S. agricultural imports from the TPP countries in 2012. Altogether, the United States 
recorded a positive $10 billion agricultural trade balance with the TPP country group in 2012. 
Though U.S. agricultural trade with Canada is mostly free and with Mexico is completely free, 
some now view the participation of these two countries in the TPP talks as an opportunity to seek 
openings for U.S. dairy and poultry products in the restricted Canadian market and to address 
ongoing non-tariff barriers that arise at times in shipping agricultural commodities to Mexico. 
                                                 
49 The Asahi Shimbun, “Japan to propose lifting tariffs on 85% of items under TPP, but not farm produce,” August 19, 
2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201308190064. For background on the politics in Japan 
surrounding the issue of agricultural trade liberalization, see “Japanese Politics and the TPP” in CRS Report R42694, 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson. 
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Table 1. U.S. Agricultural Trade with TPP Countries and World, 2012 
(in millions of dollars) 
Country 
U.S. 
Agricultural 
Exportsa 
U.S. 
Agricultural 
Importsb 
Total Two-
Way 
Agricultural 
Tradec 
U.S. 
Agricultural 
Trade 
Balance 
 Canada 20,570 20,228 40,798 342 
 Mexico 18,906 16,397 35,304 2,509 
 Japan 13,497 583 14,080 12,914 
 Vietnam 1,652 1,364 3,017 288 
 Australia 1,254 2,677 3,932 -1,423 
 Malaysia 880 1,914 2,794 -1,034 
 Chile 698 2,457 3,155 -1,758 
 Singapore 693 100 793 593 
 Peru 550 1,241 1,791 -690 
 New Zealand 371 2,240 2,611 -1,869 
 Brunei 5 0 5 5 
TPP Countries 59,077 49,202 108,279 9,876 
World 141,342 102,871 244,213 38,471 
TPP Countries’ Share of U.S. Agricultural 
Trade with World 41.8% 47.8% 44.3%  NA 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, as accessed at U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service’s Global Agricultural Trade System; ranked by export 
value. 
a. U.S. domestic exports (excludes re-exports) 
b. Imports for consumption 
c. Exports + imports 
Dairy 
The U.S. dairy sector has four objectives in the TPP negotiations: (1) limit New Zealand’s access 
to the U.S. market for its dairy products; (2) secure complete free access for U.S. dairy exports 
into Canada, (3) gain comprehensive market access for dairy products into the Japanese market, 
and (4) realize the enforcement of food safety and health rules in traded agricultural products. It 
has signaled that its support for a final TPP deal depends on its assessment of the benefits and 
drawbacks of the final dairy and related provisions that U.S. negotiators reach. In a late July 2013 
letter, 74 House members called on the Obama Administration to place a high priority on 
achieving a positive outcome for the U.S. dairy sector in the TPP by pursuing these objectives.50  
                                                 
50 Inside U.S. Trade, “Dairy Groups Seek Free Trade with Canada, But Not New Zealand, in TPP,” June 22, 2012; 
“Observers See Increasing Link Between Dairy And PHARMAC Disciplines,” December 7, 2012; Comments by the 
National Milk Producers Federation and the U.S. Dairy Export Council to USTR Concerning Negotiating Objectives 
with respect to Japan’s Participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, June 9, 2013; Office of 
Congressman Reid Ribble, “Dairy Trade Letter to Secretary Vilsack and Ambassador Froman,” July 26, 2013, 
(continued...) 
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While the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) and the U.S. Dairy Export Council 
(USDEC) initially wanted to exclude dairy products in a bilateral market access agreement with 
New Zealand, their position has since shifted .51 Both groups now state that if the terms of 
competition in bilateral dairy trade were addressed, together with the objectives outlined above, 
they would revisit the issue of whether the United States should open its dairy market to New 
Zealand.  
The concern that dairy trade does not take place on a “level playing field” targets Fonterra, New 
Zealand’s leading dairy cooperative, which purchases about 90% of the country’s milk output. 
They argue that Fonterra’s domination of New Zealand’s market provides it with a privileged 
position and makes fair competition impossible. To counteract Fonterra’s status, the NMPF and 
USDEC want the United States to negotiate tough competition disciplines in the TPP. In 
preliminary discussions earlier in 2012, New Zealand negotiators stated that their objective is 
immediate and complete access to the U.S. dairy market. Such access is their primary negotiating 
objective for the country’s agricultural sector. In March 2012, U.S. negotiators presented New 
Zealand with an initial dairy market access offer, reportedly covering non-controversial dairy 
tariff lines and shortening their phase-out periods. New Zealand recognized that this was an initial 
offer, and has noted their commitment to comprehensive market access across the agreement.  
USTR is studying whether to seek provisions to address the “competition” concerns raised about 
Fonterra. New Zealand has countered that its strong policy regulating competition applies to all 
economic sectors, including dairy, and that the “government has no concerns about Fonterra’s 
operations within that framework.” Its dairy sector plans to encourage New Zealand’s negotiators 
to highlight aspects of U.S. competition policy that benefit the U.S. dairy sector in their 
discussions with USTR. Fonterra and other dairy firms point to the anti-trust exemptions 
available to U.S. dairy cooperatives (owned by farmers) and to export trading companies that are 
allowed to coordinate prices and allocate export markets.52 Press accounts have raised the 
possibility that New Zealand may be willing to make changes in its national drug pricing and 
reimbursement program (Pharmac)—a stance that would be politically controversial—in return 
for securing additional dairy product access into the U.S. market. A reported shift in New 
Zealand’s stance on patenting software may also be part of its strategy to advance its dairy access 
objective. But when asked more recently whether New Zealand was prepared to accept new 
disciplines on Pharmac in return for U.S. concessions on dairy, its ambassador to Washington 
stressed that preserving a centralized public health system is a “red line” for New Zealand.53 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
http://ribble.house.gov/dairy-trade-letter-secretary-vilsack-and-ambassador-froman. 
51 The NMPF is the trade association that represents dairy farmers and their marketing cooperatives. The USDEC’s 
objective is to help promote dairy exports by helping member firms increase sales or reduce their costs of doing 
business. Its membership includes milk producers, dairy cooperatives, proprietary processors, export traders and 
industry suppliers. 
52 Inside U.S. Trade, “USTR Tables Initial TPP Dairy Proposal, Offers Little New to New Zealand,” March 23, 2012; 
“U.S., New Zealand Still Making Little Headway in TPP Dairy Negotiations,” June 15, 2012; “USTR Mulls Possible 
TPP Disciplines For Fonterra, But No Proposal Yet,” August 3, 2012. 
53 World Trade Online-Daily News, “Groser: NZ Seeking Reasonable Compromises On PHARMAC, GIs,” December 
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Because of the sensitivity of these issues, observers do not expect U.S. and New Zealand 
negotiators to substantively address any tradeoffs until the TPP talks are close to being concluded. 
Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, Canada retained the use of tariff-rate quotas to limit imports of 
dairy products from the United States. Imports above quota levels are subject to prohibitively 
high tariffs (e.g., 245% for cheese, 298% for butter). These quotas and tariffs are an integral 
component of Canada’s dairy supply management program, which supports milk prices by 
limiting production to meet domestic demand at a cost-determined price.54 In addition to seeking 
the elimination of these quotas, the NMPF and USDEC want U.S. negotiators to tackle 
outstanding non-tariff measures that have limited, and could further restrict, access for U.S. fluid 
milk, various dairy ingredients, and cheese in the Canadian market. Also, New Zealand sees an 
opportunity to negotiate openings for its dairy products into Canada’s market. 
Sugar 
In negotiating market access, U.S. business interests argue that the United States must not exclude 
any product from TPP coverage. They highlight pertinent text in the TPP leaders’ November 2011 
framework, which identifies “comprehensive market access: to eliminate tariffs and other barriers 
to goods and services trade and investment” as one of the features that “will make TPP a 
landmark, 21st-century trade agreement,” and the statement that the “TPP tariff schedule will 
cover all goods.” They are joined by food manufacturers that use sugar as a key ingredient in their 
products, urging USTR not to replicate what occurred in concluding the Australia FTA. In that 
agreement, U.S. negotiators succeeded in excluding additional access for Australian sugar into the 
U.S. market. The concern expressed by broad business groups and food sector firms is that U.S. 
efforts to exclude sugar or any other product from TPP coverage would prompt other countries to 
refuse to open up their markets to competition from U.S. exports or to place on the negotiating 
table issues not previously addressed in FTAs. The result, they note, would be a trade agreement 
that falls short of the high standards contemplated in a 21st century agreement.55 
U.S. food manufacturers want to see sugar included in the TPP, in order to gain access to 
additional imports of sugar and get closer to attaining a more market oriented U.S. sugar policy. 
They list the potential benefits associated with such a step—increased competition in the U.S. 
market associated with diversifying the sources of imported sugar to meet U.S. sugar demand; a 
stemming of job losses in sugar-using food processing sectors, particularly the confectionery 
industry which claims to have moved operations offshore to take advantage of lower-priced 
sugar; the generating of foreign exchange by sugar exporting countries that can be used to buy 
U.S. agricultural and food products; and gains that U.S. consumers and businesses would realize 
with lower sugar prices.56  
Sugar producers and processors oppose both reopening the sugar market access provisions in any 
current FTA with a TPP country (e.g., Australia), and granting new market access concessions on 
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sugar to any other TPP participant with which the United States does not yet have an FTA (e.g., 
Vietnam). They point out that when additional sugar supplies are needed, provisions in the 2008 
farm bill allow USDA to increase existing import quotas to meet domestic demand.57 Producers 
and processors argue that granting additional or new duty-free access to sugar from current and 
prospective TPP partners (e.g., Thailand) would instead result in an oversupply of sugar in the 
U.S. market, depress U.S. prices below loan rate levels, cause a major decline in the incomes of 
U.S. sugar producers, and trigger large federal outlays.58 
Australia, at the urging of its sugar sector, is seeking to reopen the issue of sugar access to the 
U.S. market.59 Bilateral discussions on this matter are likely to be deferred until the TPP talks 
near conclusion, when negotiators work through possible tradeoffs on the most sensitive issues. 
USTR continues to assert that the United States will not reopen market access provisions in the 
existing FTAs, including Australia. A top USTR official at a sugar production industry meeting in 
August 2012 stated “[t]here is no intention at this time to be negotiating any further with Australia 
on market access tariff issues” and that the Administration is “very cautious of what we 
negotiate” in future trade agreements and works “very closely with USDA to make sure that any 
commitments … made will not have a negative impact on the sugar program.”60 
Agricultural Issues in Other TPP Chapters 
In TPP’s “Rules” chapter, negotiators are seeking to address: how to better address disputes that 
can arise over differences on how to handle human health and animal/plant safety issues (i.e., 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS)) associated with trade in agricultural products, and the 
possible ramifications of regulating the sale of some tobacco products on trade in tobacco. The 
“Intellectual Property Rights” chapter could include provisions to prescribe how agricultural 
products with a “geographical indications” designation and traded in the TPP region are to be 
treated. The “Competition” chapter may address objectives sought by Australia and New Zealand 
to secure disciplines on TPP countries’ use of export subsidies, export credits, and food aid to 
promote their agricultural sectors. How negotiators address some of these issues could involve 
tradeoffs on the degree to which markets are opened.  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
Efforts to resolve outstanding bilateral sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) disputes with some TPP 
partners, if successful, can be expected to lead to additional U.S. agricultural exports above and 
beyond what U.S. negotiators might secure in market access talks alone. In negotiating its 
bilateral FTAs, though, the United States has pursued a two track process. Each concluded FTA 
includes a chapter that reaffirms multilateral commitments made in the World Trade 
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Organization’s (WTO’s) SPS Agreement. This Agreement lays out the rules and disciplines to be 
followed by all WTO members to ensure that each country’s food safety and animal and plant 
health laws and regulations are transparent, scientifically defensible, and fair. Also, U.S. 
negotiators have also sought to address outstanding bilateral SPS disputes in parallel talks, using 
them as leverage to cut deals on sensitive matters in FTA talks or to secure political support back 
home for a concluded trade agreement.  
As part of the effort to make the TPP a 21st-century agreement, negotiators have drafted an SPS 
chapter laying out more detailed commitments relating to human health and animal/plant safety 
issues which would go beyond those found in the WTO SPS Agreement. At the same time, USTR 
reportedly is working bilaterally to resolve existing SPS disputes (e.g., in parallel talks with 
Japan), aiming to bring home breakthroughs to garner support for an eventual TPP agreement.  
Earlier in 2012, several U.S. agricultural and food groups offered to USTR a number of 
recommendations that prescribe a process, timetable, and other ways to address SPS matters. 
Their recommendations called for promoting trade-facilitating measures such as equivalence, 
recognition of inspection systems, and the harmonization of trade certificates; requiring the 
notification of all new SPS measures; strengthening the thresholds used to conduct science-based 
risk assessments and risk management measures; and others. Most significant was their request 
that these enhanced rules be “fully enforceable” or binding upon on all TPP countries. By 
contrast, the FTAs that the United States has negotiated over the last decade do not include any 
new SPS dispute settlement, or enforcement, provisions beyond those already laid out in WTO’s 
SPS Agreement.  
At the May 2013 Lima Round, USTR tabled text to establish both a “consultative mechanism” to 
address SPS disputes that arise and a “rapid-response mechanism” designed to quickly resolve 
SPS barriers that block shipments of perishable products. This proposal does not include any 
enforcement mechanism, a top TPP priority sought by U.S. agriculture and food groups. Other 
TPP countries that also significant agricultural exporters also appear to similarly favor a dispute 
settlement process for SPS obligations.61 Previously, a letter from 24 Members of Congress called 
for the inclusion of “effective and enforceable rules” to strengthen the role of science in resolving 
differences; one agricultural group leader stated efforts to deal with strengthening SPS rules are a 
waste of time without enforceable rules.62 But a dairy sector representative expects that the issue 
of a binding SPS dispute mechanism likely will not be resolved until the TPP talks near their 
conclusion.63  
Negotiators reportedly have completed all of the technical work on the SPS chapter, and have laid 
aside outstanding issues to be resolved by higher-level officials for when TPP talks move closer 
to conclusion. The major issue on which strong differences still exist is over what approach 
should be included in this chapter to resolve SPS issues that arise among TPP members. At the 
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Lima Round, Peru reportedly tabled a counterproposal calling for full dispute settlement, in 
contrast to the “consultative” and “rapid-response” mechanisms proposed by the United States.64  
Tobacco Regulation 
USTR reportedly has decided to take a different approach in the TPP talks on the issue of 
controlling tobacco use compared with the initial draft that generated considerable controversy. 
Its new proposal, which may be tabled at the upcoming Brunei negotiating round, first would 
clarify that TPP countries agree that exceptions allowed under two multilateral trade agreements 
include measures “necessary to prevent or reduce tobacco use or its harms.” Article XX(b) of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states that WTO members agree that measures 
deemed to be “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” would not violate the 
GATT if the measure is not a “disguised” trade barrier and meets several other criteria. Article 
XVI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) includes a similar exception. 
Second, the proposal would require a TPP country to consult with other members before 
beginning a legal challenge under whatever tobacco control measures are adopted in the final TPP 
text.65 
The earlier USTR draft proposal, made public in May 2012, would have allowed public health 
authorities in TPP countries to adopt regulations that “impose origin-neutral, science-based 
restrictions on specific tobacco products/classes in order to safeguard public health.”66 The 
Administration’s objective was to create a “safe harbor” for the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) to regulate tobacco products under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act of 2009. This law gives FDA broad new regulatory authority over the manufacture, 
distribution, marketing, and sale of tobacco products in order to improve public health.67 USTR’s 
proposal was intended to protect that authority and reduce the likelihood that the final-negotiated 
TPP agreement is used in a manner that would prevent FDA from regulating tobacco products. 
Responding to this draft proposal, some Members of Congress expressed concerns that the 
proposal would prejudice the interests of tobacco producers and cigarette manufacturers seeking 
export openings in the other TPP countries. Business groups argued that it would undermine the 
longstanding claim made by USTR that provisions in previous FTAs grant governments sufficient 
flexibility to issue regulations to protect public health objectives. Other Members and anti-
tobacco groups criticized the proposal as not going far enough to protect public health, and 
wanted to see USTR’s proposal include tobacco control laws, as well as regulatory rules, and to 
exclude tobacco products from trade liberalization. Inter-agency differences within the 
Administration reportedly also surfaced. In light of these concerns and complaints that the 
Administration had not sufficiently consulted Members and stakeholders , USTR did not tablee 
its initial proposal. 
Reactions to USTR’s reported new proposal have been critical of the change in approach and say 
it raises additional questions. Five anti-smoking groups expressed disappointment that USTR 
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retreated from its earlier proposal that would have made it more difficult for tobacco companies 
to challenge domestic tobacco control measures under trade agreements. These groups note that 
USTR’s latest approach is “far weaker” than originally envisioned because it does not recognize 
tobacco as a “uniquely harmful product” or provide a way for countries to regulate tobacco in 
order to reduce its use. They also point out the new language would not cover lawsuits filed by 
tobacco firms and would not provide countries that have strong tobacco control measures with the 
protection needed to fend off challenges by the tobacco industry.68 Observers wonder how TPP 
members would handle the proposed interpretation of a multilaterally negotiated right laid out in 
the WTO agreements in the context of a regional trade agreement. Some note that the proposal 
does not make it easier for any tobacco control measure to meet the other requirements stated in 
GATT Article XX to meet its “protection” criterion. They also point out that the consultation 
requirement may still not stave off legal challenges, and argue that tobacco is still singled out as a 
unique product in the way that special rules for tobacco control measures would be applied.69 
Geographical Indications 
The WTO’s intellectual property rights agreement and related provisions in the FTAs negotiated 
by the United States recognize the use of geographical indications (GIs) to protect the quality and 
reputation of a distinctive product produced in a particular region of a country. The use of GIs 
applies primarily to agricultural products, wines, and spirits. Examples of geographical 
indications are Roquefort cheese, Idaho potatoes, Champagne, or Tuscan olive oil. Products so 
designated are eligible for relief from acts of infringement and/or unfair competition under a 
country’s trademark laws and regulations. The GI designation (similar to a registered trademark) 
protects consumers from the use of deceptive or misleading labels, and provides them with 
choices among products and with information on which to base their purchase decisions. 
Producers benefit because a GI designation recognizes the distinctiveness of their products in the 
marketplace.70  
Because GIs are commercially valuable, the European Union (EU) and some developing 
countries sought to establish tougher restrictions in the Doha Round and place limits on the use of 
geographical names for products, while the United States and other countries argued that the 
existing level of protection of such terms is adequate.71 To counter the EU’s objective in 
negotiating bilateral trade agreements to broaden the scope of agricultural products that benefit 
from a GI designation, the United States has sought to protect its interests in concluding FTAs 
(e.g., the U.S.-Korea FTA) with countries that also have a trade agreement with the EU. 
In May 2012, a group of U.S., Australian and New Zealand food and commodity organizations 
presented recommendations to TPP negotiators to limit the protection of products with geographic 
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names.72 One recommendation calls for a GI protected by a TPP country in a trade agreement 
with a third party (e.g., the European Union) to be limited to compound phrases that include the 
name of the region or sub-region where the product is produced together with the name of the 
product. For example, GI protection would extend to cheese marked Parmigiano Reggiano—a 
compound term—but not to parmesan, which would be considered a common name not eligible 
for special protection. The group states that limiting GI designations only to compound names 
would prevent confusion with the use of related common or generic terms. This proposal’s intent 
is to challenge the EU’s efforts to protect its expansive system of GIs in negotiating FTAs with 
other TPP countries, by creating exclusive rights for products that this group considers to have 
common names.  
The differing perspectives on the use of GIs reportedly surfaced among TPP countries at the 
Auckland Round. Canada and Singapore, which are negotiating FTAs with the EU, are seeking 
strong GI protections on its dairy products (e.g., cheeses), and are reported to have sensitivities on 
this issue. Australia, and New Zealand, and the United States, though, favor the less specific 
naming approach.73 
Agricultural Competition 
One of Australia’s TPP negotiating objectives, supported by New Zealand, is to secure disciplines 
on other TPP countries’ use of export subsidies, official export credits, and food aid in support of 
their agricultural sectors. Its negotiators have argued for years in the multilateral Doha Round that 
these programmatic tools distort agricultural trade and should be modified when negotiating trade 
agreements in order to minimize such impacts. They highlight the widely held view that the use 
of these tools provides a competitive edge to agricultural exporters in those countries. Australia’s 
negotiator has linked movement on including disciplines on agricultural “export competition” to 
the U.S. proposal to set disciplines on the competitive advantages held by state-owned enterprises 
(SOE).74 
Australia’s proposed text on agricultural export competition reportedly reflects in part the rules 
proposed in the 2008 Doha text on the use of export financing and international food aid.75 In that 
draft, developed countries would agree to phase out export subsidies, curtail the use of export 
credits, and prescribe under what circumstances food aid is to be provided.76 With the Doha 
Round stalled, Australia and New Zealand view the TPP as a venue to incorporate these features 
in some way “to address these issues that can cause negative effects on agricultural exporters.”77 
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In the Leesburg talks, Australia reportedly continued to press its position. At their conclusion, 
USTR’s lead negotiator acknowledged that this issue “is extremely sensitive” and made clear it is 
“not [one the United States is] inclined to address in this negotiation.” U.S. negotiators in 
previous FTA negotiations have always maintained that export competition issues should be 
addressed in the multilateral context, and succeeded in keeping them out of final trade 
agreements. But in light of continued interest in including these issues in the TPP negotiations, 
she stated USTR would begin consultations with domestic stakeholders and Congress on this 
matter.78 Just before the Auckland Round, the United States signaled its opposition to any effort to 
include food aid disciplines in the TPP, reiterating that such rules should be developed on a 
multilateral basis.79 
Observers offer various views on Australia’s motivations. Some characterize its position as a 
tactical maneuver to advance one of its priority objectives in the Doha Round. Others view the 
export competition/SOE linkage as part of Australia’s strategy to see the United States address its 
other priorities (e.g., obtaining additional sugar and dairy product access into the U.S. market, 
securing an exclusion for Australia from TPP’s final investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism).80 
 
Core Negotiating Issues: Rules 
In addition to market access, the TPP contains several provisions that build upon disciplines 
contained in the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round agreements. Many of these 
provisions have become part of the standard template for U.S. FTAs. The chief U.S. negotiator on 
the TPP, Assistant USTR Barbara Weisel, reportedly indicated that the current TPP participants 
are open to allowing developing countries in the TPP to have longer phase-in periods for rules-
based commitments. She stated that those countries would eventually have to adhere to all of the 
obligations of the agreement.81 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
The United States has sought increased intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in its FTAs. 
IPR negotiating objectives in the last U.S. trade promotion authority (P.L. 107-210) in effect 
between 2002 and 2007 included, among others (1) the application of existing IPR protection to 
digital media; and (2) negotiation of trade agreements in terms of IPR that “reflect a standard of 
protection similar to that found in U.S. law.” This phrase opened the door to the negotiation of 
provisions that go beyond the level of protection provided in the WTO Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement, most recently with the TPP negotiations. For example, 
the United States has sought to have its partner countries sign the World Intellectual Property 
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Organization’s (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty, an agreement to which Brunei, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam are not parties. For its part, New Zealand reportedly floated 
a discussion document that favors a “TRIPS-aligned” position, one that would be consistent with, 
but not go beyond, international standards already found in the TRIPS Agreement. In contrast, 
U.S. business groups have favored the TRIPS-plus provisions found in the KORUS FTA as a 
baseline for future negotiations.82 
Enforcement 
The U.S. text, parts of which have been released unofficially, call for criminal penalties for 
“willful” trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a “commercial scale.” Commercial 
scale includes acts that result in no direct or financial gain, such as file sharing. It would also 
require criminal penalties for importing counterfeit labeling and packaging whether done 
willfully or not, and it would requires criminal penalties for cam-cording in movie theatres.  
Some countries, notably Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, reportedly have sought to 
replace U.S. text on criminal enforcement with that of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), which was signed last year.83 Although both ACTA and the U.S. proposal, which largely 
track the IPR provisions in the U.S.-Korea FTA, provide stricter criminal enforcement measures 
than the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement 
(TRIPS), ACTA provides greater flexibility than what is reportedly contained in the U.S. text 
regarding a country’s enforcement of IPR. For example, in ACTA, financial gain is necessary to 
be considered commercial scale for prosecution, and willfulness is required for importation of 
trademark infringing goods. 
Internet Providers 
One area where traditionally there has been a difference of opinion among U.S. stakeholders 
relates to copyright enforcement and the Internet, especially between internet service providers 
(ISP) and traditional content providers. Internet providers and other activists are seeking to 
provide a more explicit balance in the agreement text between the rights of content providers and 
users of copyright material. The United States reportedly proposed such language to the IPR 
chapter at the San Diego round of negotiations concluded in July 2012.84 The proposal places 
certain limitations on the copyrights consistent with the so-called ‘three-step test”: that the 
exception (1) is consistent with domestic copyright law; (2) does not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work; and (3) does not unreasonably prejudice the interest of the rights holder. 
The proposal also reportedly obligates each country to provide for such exceptions in their 
domestic copyright laws. 
Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines (TEAM) 
The debate over the IPR provisions in the TPP relating to pharmaceuticals and access to 
medicines, some of the more controversial provisions in U.S.-negotiated FTAs in recent years, 
revolves around whether to assert the more far-reaching IPR provisions of the KORUS FTA or to 
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adopt the somewhat looser “May 10th Agreement” provisions found in the Colombia, Peru, and 
Panama FTAs.85 Based on published reports, it appears that U.S. negotiators are trying to develop 
an approach that would build on the May 10th agreement, which sets different standards for 
developed countries (as found in the KORUS FTA) than developing countries (as in the 
Colombia, Panama, and Peru FTAs). 
The U.S. IPR proposal relating to pharmaceuticals was tabled in the September 2011 Chicago 
round of TPP negotiations. Known as the Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines (TEAM) 
initiative, it reportedly would encourage companies to market innovations in TPP markets more 
quickly by making stronger patent term extensions, data exclusivity, and patent linkage provisions 
available to firms who apply for marketing approval for their products through a “TPP Access 
Window” of an, as yet, unspecified time period, although the pharmaceutical manufacturing 
group PhRMA released a study calling for a six year period.86 If they brought their drugs to 
market within the window, companies reportedly would receive a KORUS FTA standard of five 
years of data exclusivity, mandatory patent linkage and patent term extension provisions. 
Developing countries under the May10th agreement had commitments that capped data 
exclusivity at five years from U.S. market approval, had optional patent linkage and patent term 
extension provisions.  
According to the USTR, this provision would allow for expedited introduction of generic 
medicines.87 The U.S. pharmaceutical industry, while putting forth the abovementioned study, has 
not publicly embraced the TEAM approach with PhRMA. The pharmaceutical industry is known 
to favor the replication of U.S.-Korea FTA standards, rather than any approach that would allow 
any weakening of these standards for developing countries.88 However, opponents of this 
approach fear that it would delay the introduction of generic medicines by delaying the 
submission of new products for marketing approval under the access window as long as possible. 
According to one opponent, the plan “puts forth the fundamentally flawed premise that speeding 
up market entrance of brand-name, monopoly-priced drugs will, in itself, solve the challenge of 
access to affordable medicines.”89 In addition, the TEAM initiative proposes to 
• Eliminate tariffs on medicines and medical devices; 
• Reduce customs obstacles and internal barriers to distribution of medicines; 
• Curb trade in counterfeit medicine; and 
• Reaffirm TPP Parties’ commitment to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health.90 
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This proposal has proved controversial in the negotiations, and text-based negotiations 
concerning pharmaceutical IPR reportedly have not occurred since the Melbourne round in March 
2012.91 Peru publicly has indicated that it will not agree to proposed IPR provisions that go 
beyond the May 10, 2007 provisions that are enshrined in the U.S.- Peru FTA.92 
Biologics 
The United States seeks coverage of biologics under the proposed TPP, but it has yet to make a 
specific proposal regarding the length of coverage for data protection. U.S. biotechnology 
industry groups seek a 12-year data exclusivity provision for biologic products. Biologics are 
medical preparations derived from living organisms, but generally are not considered distinct 
from traditional pharmaceuticals in U.S. IP law.93 Biotechnology groups claim that the 
development and approval process for large molecule biologics—as opposed to small molecule 
pharmaceuticals—are more complex and require longer exclusivity periods for a product to be 
commercially viable. Under the 2010 Affordable Care Act, biologics are given a 12-year 
exclusivity period, but it is unclear whether biologics will be dealt with separately under the TPP. 
Various groups of Senators, totaling 40 in number, have written to the President supporting the 12 
year exclusivity period, as have a group of 40 Representatives.94 Separately, a letter signed by 7 
Representatives requests the President refrain from introducing a 12-year exclusivity provision in 
the negotiations.95  
Trade Secrets 
The United States is reportedly seeking language to improve protections for trade secrets, 
especially as USTR describes protection of U.S. trade secrets as a growing challenge in its 2012 
Special 301 report on IPR protections abroad.96 This text responds to the concerns of U.S. 
business that governments have pressured them to reveal trade secrets or transfer technology to 
further a country’s ‘indigenous innovation’ policies. Companies are also reportedly increasingly 
victimized by outright theft of their trade secrets, and have decried the often lax remedies 
available to combat such theft. Penalties for trade secret theft vary widely among TPP countries; 
one U.S. objective in the negotiations reportedly is to require countries to establish criminal 
penalties for the theft of trade secrets.97  
In addition, other chapters in the TPP negotiations may also concern the issue of trade secrets. 
Such an agenda may involve prohibiting countries from: (1) conditioning market access on 
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technology transfer; (2) seeking concessional terms for acquiring or licensing IPR by SOEs; (3) 
requiring the use of locally owned or developed IPR; (4) promoting the development of local 
standards to unfairly advantage local firms; and (5) requiring the unnecessary disclosure of 
confidential business information, or failing to protect that information.98 In addition, Malaysia 
reportedly has proposed preventing countries from requiring the disclosure of proprietary 
formulas for food and food products as a condition for market access.99 It is not thought that these 
practices are particularly egregious in any of the countries currently negotiating the TPP, but may 
become more salient if other nations accede to the agreement.  
 “The May 10th Agreement”
On May 10, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and the Bush Administration released a statement on 
agreed principles in four policy areas: worker rights, environment protection, intellectual property rights, and foreign 
investment. The principles were to be reflected in provisions in four U.S. FTAs—with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and 
South Korea. Regarding worker rights, the May 10th Agreement (the Agreement) required the United States and FTA 
partners to commit to enforcing the five international labor principles enshrined in International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work and that the commitment be 
enforceable under the FTA. These rights are the freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The Agreement also required FTAs to adhere to seven major multilateral environmental agreements: The seven 
agreements are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances; the Convention on Marine Pollution; the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention; the 
Ramsar Convention on the Wetlands; the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; and the 
Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Furthermore, the parties are not to waive or otherwise derogate from their labor or environmental protection laws 
in a manner that would affect trade or investment with the FTA partner(s). In addition, the labor and environment 
provisions must be enforceable, if consultation and other avenues fail, through the same dispute settlement 
procedures that apply to the other provisions in the FTA.  
The Agreement also required the FTAs to include provisions related to patents and approval of pharmaceuticals for 
marketing exclusivity with different requirements for developed and developing countries. Specifically, the Agreement 
requires provisions dealing with the effective period of data exclusivity—the restrictions on the use of test data 
produced for market approval by generic drug producers; patent extensions; linkage of marketing approval of generic 
drugs to determination of possible patent infringement; and reaffirmation of adherence to Doha Declaration on 
compulsory licensing of drugs to respond to public health crises. 
Regarding foreign investment, the Agreement required each of the FTAs to state that none of its provisions would 
accord foreign investors greater substantive rights in terms of foreign investment protection than are accorded U.S. 
investors in the United States.  
Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin (ROO) define those goods that originate in the FTA region and therefore are 
eligible for preferential treatment under the agreement. The negotiating teams are far along in 
their consideration of product-specific rules, seeking a single TPP rule of origin to the extent 
possible.100 The TPP participants have already agreed that the ROO would be “objective, 
transparent, and predictable.” Negotiators reportedly also have agreed that inputs produced in any 
TPP country may be cumulated so that a product produced with components made in multiple 
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TPP countries can be claimed as originating within the TPP region and therefore be eligible for 
preferential treatment.  
While ROOs have been discussed in terms of market access for automobiles and concerns about 
supply chains generally, they have proved especially contentious with regard to textiles and 
apparel.101 In all previous FTAs, the United States has used the “yarn forward” rule. This rule 
requires that an apparel product could be considered from within the FTA area, and therefore 
eligible for preferential treatment, if the entire manufacture of the product, from the spinning of 
the yarn to final assembly, has occurred within the FTA region. Representatives of the U.S. textile 
industry have argued for the tighter “yard forward rule” to be included in the TPP.102 Some U.S. 
apparel firms, retailers, and distributors, as well as some TPP countries, including Vietnam, seek a 
less restrictive “cut and sew,” or single transformation, rule which would allow its products 
manufactured from materials of non-TPP origin to benefit from the TPP. While U.S. negotiators 
remained committed to the yarn-forward rule, the United States and other TPP partners reportedly 
have been discussing compromise positions. For example, the United States has proposed “short-
supply provisions” to allow a certain amount of non-originating inputs in apparel assembly on a 
permanent or temporary basis and reportedly tabled an initial list of yarns and fabrics eligible for 
the short-supply designation during the Lima Round in May 2013.103 Alternatively, some have 
proposed regional value content ROOs which would allow for certain non-originating inputs to be 
used as long as originating inputs made up a certain percentage of the value of the product.104 
However, a more liberalized ROO may be opposed by U.S. FTA partners such as Mexico and 
Peru, where textile and apparel industries have been oriented to trade with the United States 
through the yard-forward standard.105 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
Technical barriers to trade (TBT) are standards and regulations that are intended ostensibly to 
protect the health and safety of consumers and for other legitimate purposes, but through design 
or implementation, discriminate against imports. In order to minimize trade distortion, WTO 
members must adhere to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The TBT Agreement 
covers voluntary standards that industries apply, technical regulations that governments impose 
for health and safety purposes, and assessment procedures that governments employ to determine 
that a product meets required standards. The TBT Agreement establishes rules and procedures for 
member countries to follow, including making sure that standards, technical regulations, and 
conforming assessment procedures are applied non-discriminately and in a manner not more trade 
restrictive than necessary. It addition, it requires that members practice transparency as 
regulations are developed and applied, that international standards are used where appropriate, 
and that the domestic technical regulations of trading partners are recognized as equivalent to 
domestic regulations when possible. A key provision of the agreement is that WTO members have 
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a central point of inquiry from which firms can ask for information on standards and regulations. 
U.S. FTAs, including the U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS), expanded on the TBT agreement by, 
among other things, providing opportunities for partner countries to comment on proposed 
standards and regulations and the implementation of regulations. TPP negotiators are seeking to 
build on the KORUS FTA as a model in developing TBT provisions and are including annexes on 
sector-specific TBT commitment to harmonize their approaches to regulations in key areas.  
Transparency in Health Care Technology and Pharmaceuticals 
Several TPP participants, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, administer a national 
formulary for medicines purchased by the government for its national health service.106 The 
United States has expressed concern that the practices and procedures such national healthcare 
programs, including New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac), which 
maintains the formulary, put “innovative pharmaceutical products,” often made in the United 
States, at a disadvantage because access to the country’s health care technology markets can be 
blocked by government’s use of procedures that are non-transparent or do not provide due 
process.107 In negotiations with Australia over a similar system, the United States and Australia 
agreed to a series of consultation and transparency mechanisms, designed to afford U.S. 
manufacturers an opportunity to make their case for inclusion in the formulary. New Zealand 
reportedly has ruled out changes to PHARMAC absent “reciprocal” concessions by the United 
States to federal or state-level drug pricing or reimbursement programs such as Medicaid.108 In 
Canada, each province maintains its own pharmaceutical formulary. 
Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment has been a high priority for the United States in its FTA negotiations, 
especially regarding the right of establishment by foreign goods and services providers in the 
territory of a partner-country. They are discussing such issues as non-discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investments and investors; minimum standard of treatment; rules on expropriation; 
transfer of payments of the foreign investor out of the host territory; exceptions for identified 
non-conforming measures; state-to-state and investor-state dispute settlement procedures; and 
prohibitions on performance requirements, such as mandatory export levels and local content 
stipulations.  
One issue that has become contentious is whether to include an investor-state dispute settlement 
provision, which allows for private foreign investors to seek international arbitration against host 
governments to settle claims over alleged violations of foreign investment provisions under the 
agreement. Except for the FTA with Australia, U.S. FTAs have included an investor-state 
provision. The investor-state provision is designed to protect foreign investors from the vagaries 
of domestic judicial systems, particularly in developing countries, in such cases as government 
expropriation of foreign-held assets. Critics have argued that investor-state procedures give 
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foreign investors greater protection than domestic investors and infringes on the sovereignty of 
the host government in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.109  
On the other hand, Australia has strongly argued against including an investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism—although it too has investor-state provisions in many of its FTAs—thus 
generating a clash with other TPP partners. The Australian position is in line with a basic trade 
policy position that the government of Prime Minister Gillard promulgated in 2011. Australia’s 
strong opposition also has been re-enforced by an attempt by the Philip Morris Tobacco Company 
to use an investor state provision in an Australian-Hong Kong bilateral investment treaty to sue 
the Australian government for its requirement for plain packaging for cigarettes. Philip Morris 
filed the suit from its Asian operations headquartered in Hong Kong.110  
Another investment-related issue that has raised some concerns relates to the ability of 
governments to impose controls on capital outflows, particularly in times of financial crises. 
Previous U.S. FTAs contain clauses which call for the free flow of capital in order to facilitate 
trade and investment. They also allow for exceptions where controls are imposed to alleviate 
short-term balance of payments problems in order to protect the stability of the financial system. 
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns that in light of global financial crises, that the 
language in FTAs might not adequately preserve governmental discretion to impose controls 
when they see fit.111 A new approach to capital controls by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which has pointed to usefulness of capital controls in ameliorating the effects of capital 
volatility during periods of economic instability, may also affect the outcome of the 
negotiations.112 
Competition Policies 
National competition laws and regulations are intended to protect consumers by ensuring that one 
firm does not so dominate a sector of the economy as to inhibit market entry and stifle 
competition. Some U.S. FTAs have included provisions to limit the trade-distorting effects of 
such laws. Among other things, U.S. FTAs require that the United States and the partner 
country(ies) inform persons from a partner country, who may be subject to administrative actions 
under domestic antitrust laws, of related hearings and provide them the opportunity to make their 
case. Under these FTAs, the partner countries agree to cooperate in enforcing competition laws 
through the exchange of information and consultation. In addition, designated monopolies and 
state-enterprises are to operate in conformance with the agreement and in accordance with 
commercial considerations.  
The November 2011 framework indicates that the TPP partners are discussing language for a 
chapter on competition policy to “promote a competitive business environment, protect 
consumers and ensure a level playing field for TPP companies.” The text will include language 
“on the establishment and maintenance of competition laws and authorities, procedural fairness in 
competition law enforcement, transparency, consumer protection, private rights of action, and 
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technical cooperation.” The U.S. business community has indicated that the provisions on 
competition policy will be critical in dealing with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly in 
addressing issues concerning their financing, regulation, and transparency, to ensure that they are 
not provided an unfair competitive advantage.113  
Trade Remedies  
Trade remedies are measures designed to provide relief to domestic industries that have been 
injured or threatened with injury by imports. They are regarded by many in Congress as an 
important trade policy tool to mitigate the adverse effects of unfairly traded imports and import 
surges on U.S. industries and workers. 
The three most commonly used trade remedies are (1) antidumping (AD) remedies that are 
designed to provide relief from the adverse price effects of imports sold at less than fair-market 
value; (2) countervailing duty (CVD) remedies, which are used to counter the adverse effects of 
foreign government subsidies to imports; and (3) safeguard actions, which are employed to 
permit temporary relief so that domestic industries can adjust to the adverse effects of surges in 
fairly traded imports. These actions are sanctioned by the WTO as long as they are undertaken in 
a fair manner and are consistent with rules specified in WTO agreements.  
Congress has insisted that the United States retain the right to use trade remedies to counter unfair 
trade practices and import surges and has expressed this requirement as a priority in trade 
negotiating authority legislation. It is also reflected in existing U.S. FTAs.  
TPP participants are discussing the possibility of including such provisions in the TPP that make 
trade remedy investigations and actions more transparent and provide due process in their 
implementation.  
Labor 
One of the more controversial issues that the TPP partner countries are addressing pertains to the 
scope and depth of provisions on worker rights. Supporters of strong worker rights, such as labor 
unions and certain non-government organizations (NGOs), are concerned that failure to promote 
and implement these rights, including collective bargaining, could lead to the imposition of low 
wages and poor conditions for workers by firms in those countries. In so doing, U.S. workers 
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage as they compete against low-cost, low-standard 
labor practices.  
The November 2011 TPP framework for negotiations indicates that the agreement will have a 
separate labor chapter. The language in the framework is ambiguous, stating only that the chapter 
would “include commitments on labor rights protection and mechanisms to ensure cooperation, 
coordination, and dialogue on labor issues of mutual concern.” The original P-4 agreement 
includes commitments to cooperate on labor issues. 
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The scope and depth of worker rights provisions in U.S. trade agreements have evolved over 
time.114 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), included labor provisions in a side 
letter requiring all Parties to enforce their own labor standards. The provisions are enforced under 
a special dispute settlement procedure attached to, but outside of, the main agreement. Based on 
the 2002 Trade Act, all subsequent FTAs, included a similar provision, but within the body of the 
agreement. Their provisions are enforceable under the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism 
and violations are subject to potential trade sanctions.  
Under the May 10th Agreement, new labor principles were included in FTAs with Peru, Panama, 
South Korea, and Colombia (see text box above). The agreement stipulated that the four FTAs 
would require each of the Parties to adopt and to maintain five internationally accepted labor 
rights that are contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and Its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO Declaration)—the freedom of association; the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of compulsory or 
forced labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation. These provisions are enforceable under FTA dispute settlement 
procedures. 
The issue of the treatment of worker rights in the TPP has provoked debate among TPP partners 
and among U.S. stakeholders. In late December 2011, the United States reportedly submitted a 
proposal on labor issues to the other TPP partners. According to one report, the proposal largely 
reflects the requirements contained in the May 10th Agreement that countries should uphold core 
ILO principles. The proposal reportedly would go further by indicting how these principles would 
be implemented by requiring countries to have labor laws related to minimum wage requirements, 
work time, and occupational health and safety. The U.S. proposal reportedly would also require 
TPP countries to take measures to reduce trade in products made through forced or child labor 
and to apply labor laws to export processing zones and free trade zones.115 To date, none of this 
information has been corroborated publically by U.S. officials.  
In a December 21, 2011, letter to then USTR Ambassador Ron Kirk, the chairmen of the House 
Ways and Means Committee and Trade Subcommittee and the ranking Members of the Senate 
Finance Committee and Trade Subcommittee raised concerns about expanding labor-related 
obligations in the TPP and, instead, argued for “improving the labor-related capacity building 
provisions in past trade agreement.” Referring to the May 10th Agreement, the letter states: 
While some of us still have serious doubts about the approach followed in the Peru, 
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea agreements, we recognize that it reflected a careful 
balancing of interests. We caution that any move to further expand the scope of the labor 
provisions would seriously undermine support for the TPP negotiations.  
Moreover, further expanding the scope of obligations could unduly expose the United States 
to potential unwarranted litigation and trade sanctions on a new and broader array of its labor 
laws and policies in this new forum. 
On the other hand, representatives of the labor community have called the proposal a “move in 
the right direction,” but have said it does not meet all of their demands. For example, labor groups 
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have called for the elimination of the requirement, included in the four most recent U.S. FTAs 
(and noted above), that the worker rights obligations only apply to the ILO 1998 Declaration and 
not to the ILO conventions.116  
Worker rights may also be controversial among the TPP partners. For example, Vietnam and 
Brunei reportedly have expressed opposition to having worker rights provisions subject to 
binding dispute settlement procedures. At the Lima Round, Canada tabled its approach modeled 
after its Canada-Panama labor cooperation agreement, which does not allow for the suspension of 
trade concessions. Instead, a dispute settlement panel would be limited to mandating the 
development of an “action plan” to remedy a dispute, and if the offending party fails to 
implement it, a monetary penalty capped at $15 million could be assessed.117 This issue is likely 
to continue to evolve as the negotiations proceed.  
Environment 
Like the U.S. position on worker rights, environmental provisions in U.S. FTAs have evolved. As 
with worker rights, environmental provisions were originally placed in side letters in the NAFTA 
agreement, and “enforce your own laws” provisions were placed in subsequent FTAs with limited 
dispute settlement based on Trade Act of 2002. The May 10, 2007, understanding added an 
affirmative obligation to adhere to multilateral environmental agreements (MEA), backed by 
potential resort to the dispute settlement provisions of the agreement, as well as a binding 
commitment to prevent countries from relaxing their environmental standards to promote trade or 
investment. 
The U.S. environment proposal was tabled at the Chicago negotiating session in September 2011. 
It reportedly contains three main components: conservation, core commitments, and public 
participation. The first component reportedly contains specific new provisions on illegal logging, 
marine fisheries, and endangered species, as well as obligations to enforce domestic laws or 
regulations on illegal trade in plants and wildlife. The second proposal would require the parties 
to uphold their commitments to any of the MEAs they have signed. The third proposal would 
allow for stakeholder participation to challenge member state’s adherence to the provisions—
including the possibility of binding dispute settlement across the disciplines.118 Subjecting the 
provisions of the environmental chapter to binding dispute settlement has proved controversial, 
reportedly even among countries that have signed FTAs with—albeit narrower—environmental 
chapters with dispute settlement provisions.119 
In addition to the U.S. proposals, New Zealand and Chile reportedly have tabled trade and climate 
change submissions. New Zealand and Chile have tabled marine fisheries and fishing subsidies 
proposals, respectively. Australia has proposed the full removal of tariffs on environmental goods 
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and green technology, a goal the United States supports and which received broad support among 
APEC members at the November 2011 APEC summit.120  
New and Cross-Cutting Issues  
In addition to treating certain existing issues in new or different ways, the TPP also seeks 
disciplines on certain activities not heretofore addressed in FTAs. These include not only 
horizontal or cross-cutting issues that address best practices in several negotiations, such as with 
regulatory coherence, but also issues not generally addressed in previous U.S. FTAs, such as 
regulatory coherence, supply chain competitiveness, and small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
While some of the commitments relating to these issues are in stand-alone chapters, others are 
included, as appropriate, in other chapters of the agreement. 
Regulatory Coherence 
The issue of regulatory coherence represents one of the new cross-cutting trade issues added to 
the TPP negotiations. The goal of regulatory coherence is to ease the conditions and costs of trade 
between TPP countries while affirming the rights of TPP countries to regulate their economies to 
promote legitimate policy objectives. According to the USTR, this initiative stems from the 
proliferation of regulatory and non-tariff barriers, which have become a major hurdle for business 
gaining access to foreign markets. Some of the goals of the effort are to “improve regulatory 
practices, eliminate unnecessary barriers, reduce regional divergence in standards, promote 
transparency, conduct regulatory processes in a more trade-facilitative manner, eliminate 
redundancies in testing and certification, and promote cooperation on specific regulatory 
issues.”121  
Issues related to regulatory coherence are covered in various chapters, including a stand-alone 
chapter on regulatory coherence as well as in SPS, TBT and other chapters. The regulatory 
coherence chapter recommends that TPP partner countries “endeavor” to establish domestic 
regulatory structures similar to the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
Office of Management and Budget, a venue to vet proposed regulations, and their compliance 
with domestic law and policy, as well as with trade agreements and other international 
obligations. Aside from seeking to assure regulatory consistency among various domestic 
agencies, the proposed mechanism would be encouraged to conduct regulatory impact 
assessments (RIA) that would assess the need for a given regulation, conduct cost-benefit 
analysis, and assess alternatives to regulation. The established body, process, or mechanism 
would also seek to assure transparency and openness in the rule-making process. The draft also 
recommends the establishment of a regulatory coherence committee among TPP members. It is 
unclear, how much, if any, of these provisions would be subject to dispute settlement.122  
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State-Owned Enterprises 
Broadly speaking, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are businesses directly or indirectly owned or 
influenced by a government. As such, governments may provide these businesses with 
advantages—such as subsidies, low cost credit, preferential access to government procurement, 
and trade protection—not enjoyed by their private counterparts, thereby hindering competition. 
Such advantages may also be directed toward companies not owned but significantly favored or 
supported by the government. This concern over potential anti-competitive behavior and 
restrictive trade has shaped texts by the United States regarding SOEs in the proposed TPP 
agreement. In the context of the current TPP negotiations, the SOE presence in Vietnam—
estimated to represent 40% of output—may warrant particular attention, although Malaysia and 
Singapore also have important SOE sectors.123 In addition, as the TPP could become a template 
for a larger Asia-Pacific FTA or future WTO negotiations, wider applicability of these provisions 
to SOEs in other countries, particularly China, may be envisioned. 
In light of these concerns about fair competition, SOEs are addressed, though not extensively, in 
several existing U.S. FTAs. NAFTA and subsequent U.S. FTAs with Australia, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, and South Korea have similar language on SOEs. Though the specific details vary among 
these agreements, most contain national treatment, non-discrimination, and transparency 
provisions, while upholding the prerogative of countries to establish and maintain SOEs. The 
U.S.-Singapore FTA includes somewhat more extensive provisions on SOEs, but they largely 
apply only to Singapore and not the United States.124 
Though some business groups, government officials, and labor groups have all expressed an 
interest in strong SOE provisions in the TPP, it remains unclear what form such provisions may 
take.125 Such measures may include provisions that seek to ensure that SOEs operate on a 
commercial basis, and to address potential trade and investment barriers. SOE disciplines may be 
enforced based on a harm test similar to that used in the WTO subsidies agreement.126 Broadly, 
these provisions will likely seek to achieve competitive neutrality with regard to SOEs. 
Competitive neutrality, a concept supported by both U.S. government and business groups, refers 
to an environment in which SOEs receive no competitive advantages beyond those enjoyed by 
private sector companies.127 
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Not all policy observers, however, agree on the appropriate strength or even necessity of SOE 
provisions in the TPP. Though the scale and the nature of their behavior differ, SOEs exist in 
some form in all TPP countries. In the United States for example, organizations such as the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the U.S. Postal Service are operated by 
the government and provide market-oriented products.128 Therefore, as with most trade 
negotiations, the U.S. position on SOEs likely seeks to balance both U.S. defensive and offensive 
interests.129 Some observers suggest that existing regulations may already adequately temper 
advantages of SOEs (e.g., subsidies, financing), while others maintain that additional provisions, 
particularly regarding transparency, will only make existing disciplines more effective.130  
The United States tabled its SOE proposal last year. USTR negotiators have suggested that TPP 
countries generally support the idea of SOE provisions in the FTA, but all parties have not yet 
agreed on specific language.131 Some reports suggest that TPP countries may be pressing the 
United States to extend the coverage of its SOE proposal to include sub-federal SOEs such as 
those at the state and municipal level.132 As with government procurement, smaller countries with 
little activity at the sub-federal level argue that they receive little benefit from such exclusions.  
More recently, in the Lima round of negotiations in May 2013, Australia reportedly tabled a 
proposal on SOE provisions.133 Australia has a domestic procedure which attempts to achieve 
competitive neutrality between private and state-owned enterprises in its own economy. Some 
speculate that Australia’s TPP proposal on SOEs is similar to its domestic policy and have raised 
concerns that such a system would be challenging to enforce in an international environment.134 
They argue it may not be effective in preventing all types of SOE benefits, such as different 
regulatory standards for private and state-owned firms.135 
E-Commerce  
According to the November 2011 framework, the TPP partners are negotiating provisions that 
would establish rules and procedures for trade in goods and services conveyed by the Internet and 
other electronic means. The text of the framework states that the provisions would address 
impediments to such trade, including customs duties, the digital environment, authentication of 
electronic transactions, consumer protection, localization requirements, and other provisions to 
ensure the free flow of information. 
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The United States considers these provisions important with the growth of the use of electronic 
commerce in an increasingly globalized economy. Recently concluded U.S. FTAs, such as the 
U.S.-South Korea FTA, included e-commerce provisions. They are designed to ensure that 
services distributed electronically benefit from the same protections as services distributed by 
other means. In addition, no customs duties are to be imposed on digital products, whether 
distributed electronically or via a physical medium, such as a disk, and digital products are to be 
treated in a non-discriminatory manner. The agreement also includes provisions prohibiting 
unnecessary barriers to the free flow of information. 
In the TPP talks, the U.S. proposals reportedly contain language that would prohibit countries 
from blocking cross-border flows of data over the Internet.136 If adopted, these provisions could 
also have implications for a member state’s ability to engage in censorship of the Internet. U.S. 
high technology groups have supported unfettered cross-border data flows and opposed 
localization requirements for data storage or server location in order to promote Internet-based 
services and cloud-computing. They claim that companies already have their own mechanisms in 
place to protect privacy and that privacy would not be undermined by open borders on data 
flows.137  
However, TPP partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, reportedly have expressed concern 
that prohibitions on local data storage could run up against their national privacy laws. Australia 
reportedly has argued that private-sector based controls would not be sufficient to protect privacy 
and has suggested alternative language to the U.S. proposal that would give governments more 
discretion on controlling data flows across borders.138 Vietnam and Malaysia reportedly have 
local content restrictions, either for mercantile or censorship reasons. 
Competitiveness and Supply Chains  
Trade in intermediate goods is an increasingly important component of international trade for 
many firms. These intermediate goods, which serve as inputs in the production of final goods, 
accounted for more than half of all non-fuel merchandise traded in 2009.139 Such intermediate 
goods represent stages along a global supply chain—the path a good takes as it is transformed 
from its basic components into a final product used by consumers. This path often crosses 
multiple international borders, sometimes more than once. U.S. imports from China, for example, 
may contain components sourced from other parts of East Asia, Europe, Latin America, and 
elsewhere, including from the United States. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
estimates that 8.3% of the value of U.S. imports is actually U.S. components that have been 
incorporated into other goods abroad and re-imported into the United States.140 
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It is unclear exactly how the TPP will address supply chains, although the issue will be addressed 
in a stand-alone chapter as well as in other chapters covering issues related to supply chains. The 
broad range of issues affecting supply chains involve many chapters already included in U.S. 
FTAs. Business groups have encouraged negotiators to consider several aspects that may affect 
the flow of goods into and out of TPP countries, and, hence the competitiveness in global supply 
chains of firms in TPP countries. These include harmonization of standards, adequate 
infrastructure (ports, roads, etc.) to facilitate trade; simplification of rules of origin; and greater 
customs efficiency.141  
Competitive supply chains and strong rules of origin may not always be mutually consistent 
goals. As a regional FTA, some international supply chains may be entirely encompassed by the 
current negotiating partners. Other supply chains, however, may incorporate intermediate goods 
that have moved into TPP countries at some point in the production process. These supply chains 
that incorporate goods originating outside TPP countries, such as apparel production in Vietnam 
that uses Chinese fabric, may present a challenge to negotiators as they try to develop rules of 
origin that balance a desire for a TPP that ensures competitiveness and cost efficiency with 
concerns over outside countries benefitting from the TPP agreement without adhering to its 
requirements.  
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (firms with less than 500 employees by the U.S. 
definition) account for the majority of firms involved in international trade (about 97%), but they 
account for a much smaller share of the value of U.S. trade (about 30%).142 In fact, in 2009, eight 
firms alone accounted for more than 10% of all U.S. exports.143 SMEs, however, also participate 
in trade indirectly as suppliers, feeding parts and components into the supply chain of larger, 
finished products that can be exported. Though SMEs represent a relatively small share of U.S. 
trade, they employ approximately half of the U.S. workforce in the non-farm private sector.144 In 
addition, academic studies have shown that small businesses create disproportionately more jobs 
than large businesses, though this may be due more to their age than their size—small firms are 
typically also young firms.145  
The characteristics of SMEs and their relatively small presence in U.S. trade have led to 
government efforts to improve SME access to international markets. The USTR commissioned a 
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series of reports from the ITC regarding the role of SMEs in U.S. exporting activities.146 Those 
reports identified barriers limiting SME access to foreign markets, and surveyed SMEs for 
suggestions on policy changes that could ease SME exporting activities. An increased focus on 
FTAs and other trading agreements was among the top three most frequent responses provided.147 
The proposed TPP agreement includes a stand-alone chapter on SMEs, although provisions 
related to SMEs are included in other chapters. This chapter may focus on SME’s capacity to take 
advantage of the enhanced trading opportunities gained through the potential FTA. Though details 
of the agreement remain sparse, the TPP country trade ministers’ statement suggests that the 
agreement will address concerns SMEs “have raised about the difficulty in understanding and 
using FTAs.”148 For example, a representative from USTR suggested that the agreement will 
attempt to address informational challenges SMEs have cited, such as access to foreign country 
tariff schedules and regulations affecting imports.149 The negotiations on the SME chapter were 
concluded during the Dallas round in May 2012.150 The quick conclusion on this topic may 
represent both a broad consensus among the negotiating partners and relatively uncontroversial 
provisions. 
Institutional Issues 
The proposed TPP likely will contain provisions related to dispute settlement and governance of 
the agreement. Given that the proposed TPP is being touted as a “living agreement,” being open 
to new members, formal procedures may be established for new members to accede to the 
agreement. 
Secretariat 
The existence or characteristics of a secretariat for the proposed TPP may be under consideration 
during the negotiations. Generally, U.S. FTAs have had minimal structures. From NAFTA 
onward, they have included a free trade commission co-chaired by USTR and trade ministers of 
the respective parties. Primarily, they have been tasked with (1) supervising the implementation 
of the agreement; (2) resolving disputes arising from its interpretation or application (see dispute 
settlement, below); and (3) supervising work of committees established under the agreement. The 
commission meets regularly once a year, and by special session at the request of a party. The 
agreements often have created committees on specific issues. The U.S. Korea FTA has 
committees on outward processing zones and fisheries. However, U.S. agreements do not have 
free-standing secretariats, and activities are carried out by staff in member’s respective trade 
ministries.151 Similarly, the P-4 agreement has a commission, but does not have a standing 
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secretariat, although New Zealand serves a repository of documents. However, other economic 
organization’s in the Asia-Pacific region, such as ASEAN and APEC do have secretariats that 
engage in trade capacity building and technical assistance activities, as well as conduct studies for 
and about their members. Negotiators may debate the question of whether having a formal 
secretariat is necessary or desirable to implement this agreement. 
Dispute Settlement 
Previous U.S. FTAs as well as the P-4 agreement provide options to resolve disputes arising 
under the agreement. These are in addition procedures with regard to investor-state dispute 
resolution (discussed above), or specialized provisions for certain disputes—for example, motor 
vehicles in the U.S.-Korea FTA.152 In general, these agreements are designed to resolve disputes 
in a cooperative manner. A party first seeks redress of a grievance through a request for 
consultation with the other party. These steps include 
• initial consultations, 
• meeting of the joint committee representing cabinet level trade officials of each 
parties, 
• establishment of a dispute settlement panel. 
In previous agreements, panels have been composed of three arbiters, of which each side appoints 
one and the third is appointed by mutual consent, or failing that, by lot from a list of individuals 
not nationals of either side. After the panel makes its decision, the unsuccessful party would be 
expected to remedy the measure or practice under dispute. If it does not, compensation, 
suspension of benefits, or fines have been traditional remedies. In addition, WTO dispute 
settlement may also be used in instances where the dispute is common to both WTO and FTA 
rules. Although State-State dispute settlement has been infrequent under U.S. FTAs, the size of 
the potential agreement, the inclusion of new members, and the negotiation of new provisions, 
may cause negotiators to scrutinize existing models of FTA dispute settlement to meet the 
challenges this agreement may bring.  
One question is whether dispute settlement will cover all the provisions of the agreement. The 
May 10th Agreement stipulated that labor and environmental provisions would be fully 
enforceable under U.S. FTAs, and dispute settlement to those provisions in the Colombia, Peru, 
Panama, and South Korea FTAs. Whether these provisions apply to the TPP have proven 
controversial both domestically, and among TPP partners in the negotiations.  
A “Living Agreement” 
The TPP has been envisaged as a “living agreement,” one that is both open to new members 
willing to sign up to its commitments and open to addressing new issues as they evolve. Thus far, 
the manner in which new members are added while the negotiations are still under way, as with 
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the case of Canada and Mexico, and possibly Japan, has followed a process agreed by current 
members informally, with each aspiring candidate being approved with the consensus of the other 
parties. In practice, the aspiring participant must not only agree to negotiate saying that 
“everything is on the table,” but must show in words, deeds, or perception that there is a genuine 
willingness to negotiate on issues sensitive to others and to commit to a high-standard agreement 
overall. This has led to months of bilateral consultations on issues of interest to the other parties, 
and in the case of Japan, discussion of possible confidence building measures in areas of the 
greatest sensitivity.  
In the case of Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand had concerns about 
Canada’s supply management system for dairy and poultry. The United States was also interested 
in leveraging action on Canada’s long languishing legislation to modernize its copyright laws. In 
return for entry in the talks, Canada and Mexico reportedly agreed not to seek to reopen chapters 
already agreed in the TPP, or possibly, sub-chapters that contained areas of agreement. In the end, 
because of the sensitivity of the issues under discussion to the countries involved, outside of the 
negotiators themselves, it may never be known what commitments were made to gain 
participation in the talks, if any.  
While the expansion of the group has been publicly contemplated, as a trans-Pacific agreement, to 
date it has focused first on APEC countries. Of these, there are many potential candidates, from 
relatively advanced economies such as South Korea or Taiwan, to middle-income states with 
dynamic economies and youthful populations like Thailand or Philippines. Other countries 
beyond APEC, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, have expressed interest, and it is it conceivable 
that other countries or trade blocs beyond the Pacific shores could link up to the agreement in the 
future.  
Aside from Japan (see below) and perhaps Korea, no new members are expected to seek to join at 
this stage, but may accede later to the final agreement. Such an accession process raises the 
question of whether a country, especially one with political or economic heft, can be expected to 
simply join an agreement already negotiated or whether it should have input on the existing 
agreement, especially if the goal is to produce a free trade area for the Asia-Pacific, or beyond. 
Yet, reopening the agreement’s substantive provisions with each new entrant—as opposed to its 
market access provisions which presumably would need to be negotiated with each existing 
member anyhow—offers up its own difficulties.  
The “Noodle Bowl” 
Differences of opinion exist among the participants as to how best and to what extent the TPP 
will serve to harmonize trade rules among the parties. They have agreed to pursue a single set of 
TPP rules of origin, which will be key to achieving this goal. However, they are pursuing 
different approaches to developing a TPP tariff schedule. The United States has maintained that it 
is negotiating market access bilaterally and only with the TPP participants with which it does not 
have FTAs: Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. Other participants have sought to 
negotiate plurilateral market access schedules. While the participants have agreed to conduct the 
tariff negotiations as they choose, they have agreed to develop a single TPP tariff schedule that 
will support the goal of facilitating trade. However, it is known that some participants seek to 
reopen the market access provisions of their prior FTAs with the United States or others. For 
example, Australia is known to seek a better market access for its sugar in the United States than 
it received in its FTA. Through TPA, or other vehicle, Congress may wish to make its views 
known about the architecture of the agreement. 
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Issues for Congress 
Congress has already taken a strong interest in the TPP negotiations even before a substantive 
agreement has been reached. Hearings have been held, and some Members have expressed views 
on the negotiations. As the negotiations proceed, a number of issues important to Congress are 
emerging. 
Negotiating a Comprehensive, High-Standard Agreement 
An issue for U.S. policymakers in general, and Congress in particular, is whether the United 
States will be able to achieve its objective of creating a comprehensive, high-standard agreement 
that encompasses a broad spectrum of trade and trade-related issues. As the largest FTA 
negotiated by the United States, it brings together a large and expanding group of countries 
representing various levels of development. Likewise, with 29 chapters under negotiations, it is 
the most comprehensive agreement in terms of breadth and depth of commitment undertaken by 
the United States. At the same time, the United States and the other TPP partners are aiming for a 
high-standard agreement to provide a structure for trade within the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st 
century. Members of Congress have already presented differing views on which countries should 
be included in a TPP, and on what constitutes “high-standards” in such areas as worker rights, 
intellectual property rights, protection for pharmaceuticals, and investor rights. Likewise, outside 
the United States, the course of the negotiations have revealed differences on the meaning of 
“high-standard” among the negotiating partners. This emerging debate may presage a vigorous 
debate within Congress on the TPP as the process proceeds and Members weigh in with their 
views.  
The Role of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and Congressional 
Trade Negotiating Objectives 
Any trade agreement that the United States reaches with TPP partners would have to be approved 
by Congress through the passage of implementing legislation, presumably under TPA procedures. 
(see text box on TPA). The latest TPA expired on July 1, 2007, although the Obama 
Administration has proceeded to negotiate the proposed TPP as if TPA were in effect. It has 
consulted with Congress and followed TPA’s procedural steps. For example, U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk formally notified Congress of the Administration’s intention to enter 
into negotiations with the TPP countries on December 14, 2009, 90 days prior to beginning the 
negotiations, as stipulated under the expired TPA. Nevertheless, some observers, including 
Members of Congress, have asserted that TPP partners will not engage in serious negotiations on 
sensitive issues without the assurance that U.S. commitments are credible and cannot be amended 
by Congress, although negotiators have not experienced this problem to date.153 
In addition, even though the Administration has been consulting Members and congressional 
staff, Congress, as a whole, formally has yet to weigh in on the form of negotiating objectives 
embedded in TPA authorizing statutes. In the past, these objectives have included reducing 
barriers to various types of trade (e.g., goods, services, agriculture, electronic commerce); 
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protecting foreign investment and intellectual property rights; encouraging transparency, fair 
regulatory practices, and anti-corruption; ensuring that countries protect environment and worker 
rights; providing for an effective dispute settlement process; and protecting the U.S. right to 
enforce its trade remedy laws. However, over the years, Congress has revised and expanded the 
negotiating objectives as policy issues have evolved and the global trading system has become 
more complex. In any renewal of TPP, Congress may wish to establish new negotiating objectives 
to reflect 21st Century trade policy including issues currently under negotiation such as state-
owned enterprises, regulatory coherence, digital technology, and trade in green technologies, 
among other areas. At the same time, the objectives would likely have to be flexible enough to 
allow the Administration to negotiate a “living agreement” that can change and be kept current 
with an evolving international trading system. It is unclear at this time if and when the 
Administration and Congress will take up the issue of TPA renewal. 
Institutional Issues 
In addition, Congress may wish to consider the institutional structure of a future TPP agreement. 
It may wish to consider the manner in which the agreement can be expanded, or upon the terms to 
which it is willing to agree to expand new members. As well as attracting new members, new 
content may be negotiated, or existing content renegotiated. In the manner of accession of new 
members, Congress may consider whether it would approve each new member, or whether U.S. 
approval would be handled in a manner similar to WTO accessions. In terms of content, Congress 
may also wish to consider whether the TPP, if concluded, would have a Secretariat or other body 
that could serve as a venue for continuing negotiations.  
Relationship with the Multilateral System 
A successfully concluded TPP agreement may shape the future course of multilateral trade 
liberalization. After 10 years of negotiations, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is 
at an impasse, and WTO members are developing new approaches to address global trade 
issues.154 TPP may offer an opportunity for a group of countries dedicated to concluding a 
comprehensive, high-standards FTA to break new ground on issues thus far not negotiated at the 
multilateral level.  
Past FTAs, such as NAFTA, incorporated new trade policy ideas, such as dispute settlement and 
intellectual property rights, that were concurrently being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
NAFTA was approved first, and the approval of NAFTA among Canada, Mexico and the United 
States helped push the Uruguay Round to conclusion. Today, the approval of a comprehensive, 
high-standard TPP agreement could signal to recalcitrant members of the WTO that trade 
liberalization can proceed without them and might spur action at the multilateral level.  
However, the world trading system is much different than it was in the early 1990s when NAFTA 
signatories (United States and Canada) made up half of the so-called “Quad-countries” (United 
States, Canada, the European Union, and Japan) that decided the Uruguay Round. Developing 
countries, such as Brazil, India, and China, that now exercise their interests in the WTO, may be 
more assertive in pursuing their own interests. Yet, as an alternative venue promoting trade 
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liberalization at the time when the WTO is not seen to be doing so, it may attract additional 
countries to the negotiations. 
The Potential Impact of the TPP on U.S. Trade Policy  
The U.S. pursuit of the TPP and the possible outcome of the negotiations raises other questions 
regarding its possible impact on the status and shape of current and future U.S. trade policy. For 
example, should the TPP preclude the United States from considering negotiating bilateral FTAs 
or other regional FTAs, such as an FTA with the EU? On the one hand, the USTR has limited 
resources so additional negotiations may become problematic. On the other hand, U.S. trade 
policymakers need to initiatives protect and advance U.S. economic interests around the globe, 
especially, as other countries continue to pursue their own FTAs.  
Similarly, the TPP raises the issue of the United States and the future of the WTO as a major force 
for trade liberalization. Some may argue, for example, that the United States has signaled the 
death knell of future rounds of multilateral agreements in favor of regional pacts. Others might 
assert that the TPP could serve as a building block for a more viable multilateral trade system that 
responds to trade challenges of the 21st century. Some may even say that the TPP may become the 
predominant force for trade liberalization going forward, that is, if it can agreed to by the current 
parties. 
Another issue for possible consideration is: What would be the impact on U.S. trade policy if the 
TPP negotiations are not completed successfully or are delayed indefinitely? Some could argue 
that such an outcome would indicate that it is not feasible to negotiate a comprehensive set of 
rules with a diverse group of countries and that the United States would have to tailor its 
ambitions. In addition, some might assert that such an outcome would signify a temporary, if not 
permanent setback to the notion of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific? (FTAAP). Still others 
may conclude that such result could force the United States to retreat from negotiating trade 
agreements altogether.  
Conclusion 
The potential Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement may have a large impact on U.S. trade and 
trade policy, but much of its substance and its future remains undecided. The agreement is 
ambitious in at least three ways: (1) in terms of its size—it would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade 
flows and could expand in a region that represents over half of all U.S. trade; (2) the scope and 
scale of its liberalization—the negotiating partners have expressed an intent to comprehensively 
reduce barriers in goods, services, and agricultural trade as well as rules and disciplines on a wide 
range of topics including new policy issues that neither the WTO nor existing FTAs yet cover; 
and (3) its flexibility—this “living agreement” has been and may continue to be expanded in 
terms of its membership and its trade and investment disciplines.  
Due to this level of ambition, however, achieving such an agreement may be difficult. Differences 
in opinion exist, both domestically and among the negotiating partners, on precisely what form 
the agreement’s provisions should take. A broad range of U.S. interests groups view the TPP as a 
way to “correct” flaws in previous U.S. FTAs, but changes that some groups consider 
improvements to U.S. trade policy others see as unwarranted intrusions into other aspects of 
public policy, or may contribute to economic insecurity for some Americans. Even challenges 
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with “20th-century” trade issues, such as market access for goods, have yet to be resolved among 
the TPP partners.  
Yet, the partner countries have expressed their commitment to achieving this ambitious agreement 
and the negotiators remain positive about the progress being made. This group of countries have 
self-selected into the negotiations presumably because they see the TPP as a catalyst to greater 
economic growth and prosperity, especially if it is expanded to include other countries. In 
addition, the large network of existing FTAs among the members could be seen as an indicator of 
their willingness to cooperate on trade issues and may imply that some of the challenging issues 
have already been addressed. 
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Appendix.  
Table A-1. U.S. Goods Trade with TPP Countries, 2012 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Total Balance 
Canada  291,758 324,246 616,004 -32,488 
Mexico  216,331 277,653 493,984 -61,322 
Japan 70,046 146,388 216,434 -76,342 
Singapore  30,561 20,224 50,785 10,337 
Australia  31,208 9,536 40,744 21,672 
Malaysia  12,854 25,934 38,788 -13,080 
Chile  18,886 9,381 28,267 9,505 
Vietnam  4,623 20,266 24,889 -15,643 
Peru  9,357 6,426 15,783 2,931 
New Zealand  3,223 3,439 6,662 -216 
Brunei  157 86 243 71 
Total 689,004 843,579 1,532,583 -154,575 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Notes: Rank based on total trade (imports + exports); U.S. general imports, U.S. total exports. 
Table A-2. U.S. Services Trade with TPP Countries, 2011 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, ordered by total trade) 
Country Exports Imports Total Balance 
Canada 56,076 28,028 84,104 28,048 
Japan 44,393 24,772 69,165 19,621 
Mexico 25,207 13,745 38,952 11,462 
Australia 16,088 6,315 22,403 9,773 
Singapore 10,451 4,442 14,893 6,009 
Chile 3,016 1,233 4,249 1,783 
Malaysia 2,571 1,361 3,932 1,210 
New Zealand 2,115 1,814 3,929 301 
Total 159,917 81,710 241,627 78,207 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 2012. 
Notes: Rank based on total trade (imports + exports); BEA does not collect services trade data from every 
partner country. 
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